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This paper uses microeconometric simulations to characterize the distributional 
changes occurred in the Bolivian economy in the period 1993-2002, and to 
assess the potential distributional impact of various alternative economic 
scenarios for the next decade. Wage equations for urban and rural areas 
estimated by both OLS and quantile regression are the main inputs for the 
microsimulations. A sizeable increase in the dispersion in worker unobserved 
wage determinants is the main factor behind the significant increase in 
household income inequality in the 90s. The results of the microsimulations 
suggest a small poverty-reducing effect of several potential scenarios, including 
education upgrading, sectoral transformations, labor informality reduction, 
gender and race wage gap closing, and changes in the structure of the returns to 
education. Sustainable and vigorous productivity growth seems to be a 
necessary condition for Bolivia to meet the poverty Millennium Development 
Goal by 2015.  
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Bolivia experienced important economic, political and social changes during the 90s 
following major structural reforms in the latter half of the 80s. Macroeconomic stabilization 
was accompanied by market reforms to increase private sector participation, align prices 
with market forces and increase the integration to the global economy, as well as by 
important political reforms to strengthen the democratic process. As part of the HIPC 
initiative in 2000-2001 the country developed its national Poverty Reduction Strategy with 
broad participation of different sectors and donors. 
 
The Bolivian economy expanded at an average annual rate of 4.4% for most of the 90s, but 
decelerated to an average rate of only 1.7% during 1999-2002 in the face of external and 
internal shocks. The country has achieved considerable improvements in living conditions, 
particularly in education, health and other social indicators, although yet insufficient to 
meet many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Particularly, progress in 
reducing income poverty during the 90s was very limited and has been partially reversed 
with the economic stagnation that set in after 1999. Bolivia continues to be one of the 
poorest countries in the region. Inequality remains among the highest in the region and is a 
key factor as to why growth has made a small dent in poverty. The Gini coefficient for the 
distribution of household per capita income in 2002 was close to 60, placing Bolivia as one 
of the most unequal economies in Latin America, and in the world.  
 
This paper analyzes the factors driving changes in the Bolivian income distribution by 
estimating wage equations from household survey microdata. We use the results of these 
estimations for two different microsimulations exercises. In the first one we decompose the 
inequality changes between 1993 and 2002 into the contribution of changes in observed 
characteristics of households and individuals, the returns to those characteristics and 
unobserved heterogeneity. We find that a sizeable increase in the dispersion in unobserved 
wage determinants is the main factor behind the significant increase in household income 
inequality in the 90s. 
 
In the second exercise the coefficients of the wage equations estimated for 2002 are used to 
predict the distributional outcome of several alternative scenarios that could be generated 
by public policy interventions. We are especially interested in assessing the potential of 
each scenario in helping Bolivia reach the MDGs of halving poverty by 2015. The results 
of the microsimulations suggest a very modest poverty-reducing effect of a range of 
potential scenarios including education upgrading, sectoral transformations, labor 
informality reduction, gender and race wage gap closing, and changes in the structure of the 
returns to education. Only sustainable and vigorous productivity growth seems to be able to 
help Bolivia meet the poverty MDG by 2015. 
 
In both exercises we stress the convenience of estimating the wage models by quantile 
regressions, in addition to more traditional methods. The estimation of differential returns 
to education and other worker characteristics by conditional quantiles of the wage 
distribution may substantially enrich the analysis by allowing to assess the role of 
heterogeneities that are ignored in mean regression models. Despite this theoretical 
advantage, in practice for the case of Bolivia we find only modest advantages of considering quantile regression models. One exception arises from the fact that between 
1997 and 2002 in urban areas the returns to higher education increased for the mean, but 
decreased for the bottom quantiles. Taking this fact into consideration by using quantile 
regression allows us to estimate with much more precision the impact of the changes in the 
returns to education on the wage and household income distributions.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the data and show 
wage equations estimated by both OLS and quantile regression. The results of these 
estimations are used in section 3, where we characterize inequality changes in the wage 
distribution and the equivalized household income distribution in Bolivia between 1993 and 
2002 through microeconometric decomposition techniques. In section 4 we use the 
estimates of the Mincer equations for 2002 to simulate the potential effect on different 
dimensions of the income distribution of some economic and social policy changes. Section 
5 concludes with final remarks.  
 
2.  Wage equations  
In this section we first present the data, then show the results of the wage equations 
estimated for 2002, which serve as inputs for the microsimulations of section 4, and finally 
show results of the wage equations estimated for 1993, 1997 and 2002, which are the basic 
inputs for the decompositions of section 3.  
 
2.1. The data  
 
Distributional statistics come from household surveys. Bolivia has substantially improved 
its household surveys during the last decade. Among other things, the coverage of the 
survey has become national, and most sources of incomes (including non-monetary 
payments) have been introduced in the questionnaires. These improvements, however, 
introduce comparability problems among surveys in different years. For instance, the 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (EIH) of the early 90s was only urban, while the most 
recent Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) is nationally representative. To alleviate this 
comparability problem we identify in the recent surveys areas covered by the early surveys 
to provide a “bridge” to connect results from different time periods. Table 2.1 shows the 
characteristics of each survey used in the paper.  
 
Unfortunately, there are several comparability problems across surveys, since 
questionnaires have varied over time. For instance, the questions regarding earnings are 
different in the three household surveys used for this paper. Besides, the 2002 survey 
includes estimations of non-monetary payments, while the surveys of 1993 and 1997 do not 
have this information. The questions for education have also varied over time. These 
changes, for instance, make impossible to identify individuals with incomplete superior 
education from those with a college degree in a consistent way over time. An additional 
problem is caused by the fact that the Bolivian primary education system has changed three 
times in the last decades. In a given survey there are people who studied in the old system 
(6 years), some others in the previous system (8 years divided in two levels: “basic” and 
intermediate”) and the rest in the current one (8 years).   
We tried to make all the definitions consistent. For that reason we ignore non-monetary 
payments in the analysis. Also, for the decomposition of inequality changes between 1993, 
1997 and 2002 (see section 3) we had to restrict the educational dummies to five categories: 
no education, primary, secondary, technical college and college. This specification does not 
allow to capture graduation or ship-skin effects, but it has the advantage of considering 
homogenous definitions across years. When estimating the 2002 wage equations to perform 
the microsimulations of section 4 we are able to expand the categories to consider 
incomplete and complete educational levels.   
 
2.2. Wage equations, 2002  
 
The estimation of wage equations is a key step for both the decomposition of past 
distributional changes performed in section 3 and the simulations of potential future 
scenarios made in section 4. We split the sample of workers into 4 groups according to two 
criteria: (1) individual role in the household (household heads and non-household heads),
1 
and (2) type of labor market (urban and rural). Thus, we estimate the hourly earnings 
equations separately for household heads and non-heads, both in rural and urban areas.  
 
The specification of the four models is almost the same. The dependent variable is the log 
of hourly earnings (log of wages). The vector of covariates includes the typical human 
capital proxies as education and age (and its squared), and other controls such as gender, 
ethnicity, sector of activity, geographical region, and labor-informality indicators. For the 
non-household heads we include an indicator of whether the individual is the spouse of the 
household head or any other family member. 
 
As a measure of educational attainment we use six educational categories: no education, 
primary incomplete and complete, secondary complete and complete, and superior. An 
alternative specification could be a quadratic function of years of education. However, this 
is a more rigid specification, it does not allow for ship-skin effects, the variable years of 
education is not very reliable in the surveys of the early 90s, and moreover the gain of 
being able to compute returns for each year does not seem to be large, since returns are 
mostly constant within educational levels.
2 As explained above, we do not separate superior 
education into incomplete and complete due to changes in the household surveys questions 
over the 90s, which make impossible to identify these two categories in a consistent way.  
 
For the estimation of the parameters in the wage equations we use alternatively (a) ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and (b) quantile regression methods. The choice of OLS instead of 
other methods that allow controlling for sample selection is based on two considerations: (i) 
in absence of a good model for the selection equation, controlling for sample selection is 
not a dominant practice; and (ii) comparability with the estimations by quantile regressions.  
                                                 
1 We prefer this specification, instead of estimating models for men and women, since in the decompositions 
we assume that the spouse (rather than the women) takes the labor market participation decision based on the 
labor status of the head (rather than the men) of the household.  
2 For instance, for the wage equation of household heads in urban areas in 2002 we find even small negative 
returns to the first years of schooling using a quadratic function of years of education.  
In what follows we provide a brief explanation of the potential advantages of estimating the 
wage equations also by quantile regression techniques.  
 
Quantile regressions  
 
Evidence for increasing within-inequality has been found in many countries, suggesting a 
relevant role for factors that are not captured in household surveys, like quality of 
education, labor market connections, or work ethics.
3 Quantile regression are designed to 
take advantage of that information by modeling quantiles of the conditional distribution of 
the response variable as functions of the observed covariates.
4 With sizeable unobserved 
heterogeneity mean linear regression models provide only a limited characterization of the 
dependent variable as a function of covariates, since this is modeled as a unique function of 
the covariates. In particular, models seek to find the relationship between the observed 
covariates and the mean of the conditional distribution of the response variable. This 
characterization leaves useful distributional information outside the model. The technique 
of quantile regression, introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978), can provide a richer 
characterization of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable when the 
regression errors are not iid. Although quantile regression was originally proposed as a 
robust alternative to OLS for estimating the parameters of a linear model, the literature has 
used this technique for revealing how the covariates affect the entire shape of the 
conditional distribution. To provide a brief idea of quantile regression, write a wage 
equation as  
 
(2.1)                                                   w = Xβ + ε 
 
where w is the (log) hourly wage, X is a vector of covariates, β a vector of parameters, and 
ε a vector of independent error terms. The θ-th conditional quantile of w can be written as  
 
(2.2)                                                     ) ( ) \ ( θ β θ X X w Q =   
 
where the θ-th conditional quantile of the error term is assumed to be zero. Equation (2.2) 
can be defined for a set of quantiles θ, given rise to a family of quantile regression curves, 
which provide a more detailed characterization of the relationship between X and w. 
Naturally, the most interesting case is when the estimated β(θ) coefficients differ across 
quantiles θ, suggesting that the marginal effect of a particular explanatory variable differs 
across quantiles of the conditional distribution of w.  
 
Suppose X is just years of formal education. OLS provides a single β, and hence a single 
estimate of the returns to education for the whole population. Returns to education however 
may depend on some unobservable factors, like education quality, talent, or labor market 
connections, and hence they may differ across groups of these factors. Quantile regressions 
                                                 
3 See Buchinsky (1994) and Juhn et al. (1993) among others.  
4 See Koenker and Portnoy (1997) for an overview of the motivation, models and estimation strategies for 
quantile regression. provide a parametric way to assess these potential differences. By modeling the conditional 
distribution of wages by quantile regression, we allow the unobserved component of wages 
to interact with the available measures of observed skills. Moreover, it allows to recover 




In what follows we present the results of the wage equations for 2002 estimated by OLS 
and quantile regression techniques. The results described here correspond to the 
specification used for the simulations in section 4. Tables 2.2 to 2.5 report OLS and 
quantile regression estimates for each of the four sample groups considered. These results 
are also plotted in Figures 2.1 to 2.4, where we show the estimated quantile regression 
coefficients, the mean effect estimated by OLS, and the corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Estimations by OLS produce positive returns for each educational level and, at least for the 
higher levels (beyond secondary education), they are always significant. For household 
heads in urban areas each level significantly contribute to increase hourly earnings. Primary 
school increases the mean wage of this population group in almost 30%. However, there 
seems to be no difference in wages from having some primary education and finishing that 
educational level. The returns for secondary incomplete, secondary complete and superior 
are 46%, 49% and 110% respectively, compared to a similar household head worker with 
no education. It is interesting to notice that for urban non-heads workers and for rural 
workers having incomplete primary education does not add to wages, while the 
contribution of having a primary education degree is small and probably non-significant.  
 
Unexpectedly, the quantile regression estimates are quite consistent with the ordinary least 
square estimates. It is clear from the figures that the quantile regression estimates lie inside 
the 95% confidence interval for the estimated mean effect in most cases. One of the 
exceptions to this pure location shift effect for the group of urban household heads appears 
at the lowest quantile (0.10), where in contrast to OLS estimates, high school completion 
and college education have almost no returns in terms of wages. There are also some cases 
in which for the higher quantiles the estimated return significantly exceeds the mean effect. 
 
The specification adopted for the hourly earnings equations includes age and its squared to 
capture non linearities in the returns to aging, potentially related to work experience. 
Except for the group of non-household heads in rural areas, age has a significant concave 
(mean) effect on wages. For household heads, both in urban and rural areas, aging increases 
wages up to age 45 approximately. Again, the quantile regression estimates do not differ 
significantly from the estimated mean effect. Despite this fact, at the lower quantiles the 
wage-age profiles appear to be more concave. For household heads in urban areas, for 
example, hourly earnings for the first quantile increase between ages 14 to 40 and then 
decreases, while for the highest quantile wages continue increasing up to age 52, 
amplifying the wage gap. 
 
For all of the four sample groups being a male is associated with higher expected earnings 
per hour. In rural areas male non-heads workers earn in average around 80% more than a woman with similar characteristics. For the rest of the groups the wage gap in favor of men 
hovers around 28%. This effect appears to be slightly decreasing by quantiles for household 
heads, possibly reflecting the higher dispersion of female earnings. For household heads in 
rural areas, for example, for quantiles 0.6 and higher the gender effect is not significant. For 
non-household heads the gender effect seems to be quite constant across the conditional 
distribution of the independent variable. 
 
To control for the potential effect of the worker sector of activity on wages we include five 
sectoral dummies: manufacturing industry, utilities and transportation, construction, 
commerce, and skilled-labor intensive services (government, education and business). The 
omitted category is the primary sector (agriculture, fishing and mining). In general, the 
mean effect of not being in the primary sector is to increase hourly wages. This effect is 
particularly high for household heads in rural areas, where the return to working in the 
manufacturing industry or in the skilled-labor intensive services -compared to the primary 
sector- is approximately 65%, while working in commerce has the (mean) effect of more 
than duplicating wages. In contrast to other variables, the effect of sector of activity on 
wages varies significantly across conditional quantiles, especially in urban areas. Generally, 
not being in the primary sector has a stronger effect for the lower quantiles and sometimes 
insignificant for the higher ones. This might be caused by a relatively higher dispersion of 
earnings in the primary sector. 
 
According to OLS estimates the effect of informality in urban areas is to reduce wages, 
both for informal salaried workers and the self-employed. In rural areas informality appears 
to have a negative effect, though not always significant, only for salaried workers. 
Regarding the quantile regression estimates, the effect of informality for wage-earners is 
generally consistent with the results from OLS estimation. In contrast, for the self-
employed informality has strong negative effects for the lower quantiles, and - depending 
on the case- no effect or even positive effects for the upper quantiles. This fact is consistent 
with high heterogeneity within this group, which comprises self-employed workers of very 
low productivity and highly productive self-employed professionals.  
 
For the 2002 survey we have information on the first language spoken by the worker, which 
we use as a proxy for ethnicity. The indicator takes the value 1 for individuals who have 
Spanish as their first language. According to OLS estimates, having Spanish as the first 
language has a positive effect on wages for household heads, while it is unimportant to 
determine wages of other population groups. For household heads in urban areas the mean 
effect is a 17% increase in wages, while for rural areas it hovers around 25%. Estimates by 
quantile regression do not differ significantly from the estimated mean effect.  
 
2.3. Wage equations, 1993-2002  
 
For the decompositions of section 3 we need to estimate wage equations for 1993, 1997 and 
2002. As it was explained before, consistency problems prevent us to differentiate those 
individuals who completed a given educational level from those who did not.  
 Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the results of estimating the wage equations by OLS. To help 
interpret the results regarding the returns to education, Figures 2.5 to 2.7 depict the 
predicted hourly wages as a function of the educational level for male household heads 
aged 40 living in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, working in the manufacturing industry in a formal 
job. In each figure values are normalized so that wages for those with primary education 
coincide in both years. Returns to education are always positive. The wage-education 
profile became less convex between 1993 and 1997 in the main cities of Bolivia, as the 
returns to college education significantly decreased, implying an equalizing effect on the 
wage distribution.  
 
In contrast, returns to a college education increased between 1997 and 2002 in urban areas. 
This change in the wage-education profile implies an inequality-increasing effect on the 
hourly earnings distribution, and also on the equivalized household income distribution, 
since workers with a college education are located in the upper tail of that distribution. 
From the figures, this unequalizing effect, however, seems to be weaker than the equalizing 
effect of the early 90s. Similar changes have occurred for spouses and other members of the 
household. 
 
Figure 2.7 does not show a clear pattern of change in the returns to education in rural areas 
between 1997 and 2002. Returns to primary education and secondary education fell relative 
to no education, while there was a large increase in the returns to those with a non-
university superior education. The aggregate effect of these changes on wage inequality is 
not clear. The decomposition can help us to assess the sign and size of these effects on the 
income distribution.   
 
The standard deviation for the distribution of the regressions residuals are shown under the 
label of sigma in Tables 2.6 to 2.7. These residuals are usually interpreted as capturing the 
effect of unobservable factors like natural school quality, ability, labor market connections, 
or work ethics on wages. The values of sigma in the table suggest that the dispersion in 
these unobservable factors have substantially increased in Bolivia over the last decade both 
for heads and non-heads. This fact could be the consequence of an increasing dispersion in 
the endowment of the unobservable factors and/or an increase in the “returns” to these 
endowments. The latter interpretation has been the dominant in the literature (see Juhn et 
al., 1993), and it is particularly more compelling for short periods of time. The increase in 
the values of sigma is sufficiently large to believe that a sizeable proportion of the overall 
increase in the dispersion of wages can be due to this factor. The decomposition analysis 
will assess this relevance within a more rigorous framework. 
 
As in most countries, in Bolivia men earn more than women even when controlling for 
observable characteristics. According to the results of the wage regressions the gender 
wage gap has significantly shrunk between 1993 and 1997, but has widened again in the 
next 6 years, both in urban and rural areas.  
 
Tables 2.8 to 2.10 show the corresponding results using quantile regression. It is interesting 
to notice that changes in the returns to education have not always been the same across the 
conditional quantiles. For instance, Figure 2.8 shows that for household heads between 
1997 and 2002 in urban areas the returns to college education fell for quantile 0.1 while they increased for quantiles 0.5 and 0.9. For technical college the increase in the returns is 
very small for quantile 0.1 and much larger for the rest, while the returns to secondary 
school fell for quantiles 0.1 and substantially increase for quantile 0.9. Similar divergent 
patterns for the change in the returns to education across conditional quantiles are present in 
the results of Tables 2.8 and 2.10.  
 
3.  A characterization of inequality changes, 1993-2002 
In this section we show inequality patterns for Bolivia during the last decade, present a 
methodology that helps to characterize distributional changes, and report the results.  
 
3.1. Income inequality in Bolivia  
 
Bolivia is, and has been for decades, one of the most unequal countries in Latin America, 
and in the world. This fact combined with low per capita GDP account for the high poverty 
levels of the country. Figure 3.1 shows the Gini coefficient for the distribution of household 
equivalized income for several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) around 
year 2000. Bolivia clearly stands as a high-inequality country.  
 
The focus of this section is not on the relative position of Bolivia in the region, but instead 
on the factors underlying the persistent highly unequal income distribution in the last 
decade. In particular, we divide the decade into two periods according to the growth 
performance: 1993-1997, a period where the economy grew at an average rate of 4.5%, and 
1997-2002, a period of stagnation.  
 
Column (i) in Table 3.1 shows the Gini coefficient for the distribution of household 
equivalized income, defined as total household income divided by the number of adult 
equivalents raised to a parameter that captures household economies of scale (see Deaton 
and Zaidi, 2002).
5 Household income comprises labor and non-labor income and includes 
only monetary payments, since non-monetary payments are not available in all surveys in 
the period under analysis. The Gini coefficient for the distribution among individuals of 
equivalized household income remained constant around 50.3 between 1993 and 1997 in 
the urban areas covered until mid 90s. In the next 6 years the Gini for these areas increased 
3 points, while inequality for the whole country increased 2 Gini points, which represents a 
substantial increase.
6 Confidence intervals computed by bootstrapping techniques, shown 
below the Gini coefficients in the table, confirm the significant inequality increase between 
1997 and 2002.  
 
                                                 
5 The denominator is ()
θ α α 2 2 1 1 . . K K A + + , where A is the number of adults, K1 the number of children 
under 5 years old, and K2 the number of children between 6 and 14. Parameters α allow for different weights 
for adults and kids, while θ  regulates the degree of household economies of scale. Following Deaton and 
Zaidi (2002) for less-developed economies like Bolivia we take intermediate values of the αs (α1=0.5 and 
α2=0.75), and a rather high value of θ (0.9) as the benchmark case. 
6 The increasing trend in inequality was also noticed by other authors (Gasparini, 2003; Morley, 2001; 
Székely, 2002), who include data until 1999. Labor is the most important income source captured by the household surveys in Bolivia 
(around 90% of total income). Given the difficulties in modeling capital income and 
transfers, in most of the rest of the paper we ignore these income sources and work with 
household income obtained only from labor sources. Column (ii) in Table 3.1 shows the 
Gini for the distribution of equivalized household labor income in the survey. In column 
(iii) we restrict the analysis to households included in the microsimulation. They are 
basically households with complete and consistent answers not living exclusively on rents 
and pensions. The trends in inequality for the more restricted variables in columns (ii) and 
(iii) do not significantly varied from the trend of the more general variable in column (i).  
 
The second panel in Table 3.1 shows that inequality in wages and earnings has also 
significantly increased in Bolivia in the last decade. That pattern is clear when working 
with both all the survey and the subsample used for the decompositions.
7 
 
3.2. Decomposing distributional changes with OLS wage equations  
 
Decompositions provide counterfactual distributions that are helpful to characterize past 
changes in inequality and poverty, and to make predictions on the distributional impact of 
future changes in economic factors and public policies. Microeconometric decomposition 
techniques (also known as microsimulations) have been initially applied to the study of 
discrimination (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973; Oaxaca and Ramson, 1994), and more 
recently in the inequality literature (Juhn et al., 1993; Bourguignon et al., 2001). In the last 
few years, this methodology has become a usual tool for the analysis of distributional 
changes (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (eds.), 2003). We first provide a brief 
explanation of this methodology and then show the results for Bolivia.
8  
 
The basic idea of the decompositions is to simulate the distribution in time t1 if some of its 
determinants (parameters or distribution of covariates) were those of time t2, and compare 
that counterfactual distribution to the real one in t1. The difference between the two 
distributions can be attributed to the change in the selected determinants between t1 and t2.  
 
Let Yit  be individual’s i labor income at time t, which is written as a function F of  the 
vector Xit of individual observable characteristics affecting wages and employment, the 
vector εit of unobservable characteristics, the vector βt of parameters that determine market 
hourly wages and the vector λt  of parameters that affect employment outcomes 
(participation and hours of work). 
 
(3.1)                                               ) , , , ( t t it it it X F Y λ β ε =               i=1,...,N                                  
 
where N is total population. The distribution of individual labor income can be represented 
as  
 
                                                 
7 The use of other inequality indexes does not change the picture of inequality trends. Results for other indices 
are available from the authors upon request.  
8 The following explanation is based on Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2003).  (3.2)                                                { } Nt t t Y Y D ,..., 1 =   
 
We can simulate individual labor incomes by changing one or some arguments in equation 
(3.1). For instance, the following expression represents labor income that individual’s i 
would have earned in time t if the parameters determining wages had been those of time t’, 
keeping all other things constant.   
 
(3.3)                                              YF X it t it it t t () ( ,,,) '' β ε β λ =               i=1,...,N 
 
More generally, we can define Yit(kt’) where k is any set of arguments in (1). Hence, the 
simulated distribution will be  
 
(3.4)                                               { } Dk Yk Y k tt tt N tt () () , . . . , () '' ' = 1  
 
The contribution to the overall change in the distribution of a change in k between t and t‘, 
holding all else constant, can be obtained by comparing (3.2) and (3.4). The comparison 
between the actual and the counterfactual distributions can be made in terms of any 
indicator of any dimension of the distribution (e.g. poverty, inequality, polarization, 
aggregate welfare). For instance, if we are interested in inequality comparisons, and we 
define an inequality index as I(D), the effect of a change in argument k on earnings 
inequality will be given by  
 
(3.5)                                                      ) ( )) ( ( ' t t t D I k D I −  
 
If, for instance k = β
ed (i.e. the parameter linking education with hourly wages), equation 
(3.5) will provide an estimate of the effect of changes between time t and t’ in the returns to 
education on earnings inequality.  
 
In order to compute (3.5) we need estimates of parameters β and λ and the residual terms ε. 
We adopt an econometric specification similar to the one used by Bourguignon et al. 
(2001), which corresponds to the reduced form of the labor decisions model originally 
proposed by Heckman (1974).
9 The model has two equations, one for wages and one for 
the number of hours of work, where the error terms represent unobserved factors affecting 




Table 3.2 shows the main results of applying this methodology to the case of Bolivia for the 
distributions of hourly wages and equivalized household labor income. The results shown 
are averages over the simulations using alternatively the first and second year as base years. 
As it was explained the microsimulations generate counterfactual distributions. For 
simplicity we just report the Gini coefficients of these distributions, but other inequality 
indices and measures of other dimensions of the distributions are available upon request.  
                                                 
9 See Gasparini et al. (2003) for details on the estimation methodology.  
To explain the table, let’s concentrate in panel B, which shows the results for the 
decomposition of changes between 1997 and 2002 in urban areas. The Gini coefficient for 
the hourly wage distribution increased 2 points between those years.
10 If only the returns to 
education had changed in that period the Gini would have gone up just 0.2 points, 
according to the estimates of model 1. This means that the returns-to-education effect has 
been unequalizing, confirming the presumption from the previous section.  
 
Model 1 corresponds to the specification shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. We have worked 
with a large number of alternative specifications. In the table we show two alternative 
models where sectoral and informality dummies are ignored. Also, in model 2 wage 
equations are estimated separately for spouses and other members (instead of just non-
heads). Although the main qualitative results are quite strong to different specifications, the 
magnitudes of some of the effects are unstable. For instance, the returns-to-education effect 
that seems small in panel B when using model 1, becomes more important when using 
model 2.   
 
As discussed before changes in the returns to education were inequality-decreasing between 
1993 and 1997. According to the results of the decompositions, the direct impact of these 
changes was a fall in wage inequality of around 1 Gini point. That change translated into a 
drop in equivalized household income inequality of the same size. In contrast, changes in 
the returns to education in urban areas between 1997 and 2002 were unequalizing, although 
smaller compared to the changes in the early 90s. In rural areas the inequality impact of the 
change in the wage-education profile turns out to be negligible.   
 
The gap between skilled and unskilled workers has widened in terms of hours of work over 
the last decade: while college graduates worked in 2002 around 3 hours more per week than 
in 1997, those with only primary-complete worked on average 2 hour less. These changes 
have had an unequalizing effect on the distribution, which shows up in Table 3.2. However, 
the impact seems to be modest: in none of the cases the Gini increases more than half a 
point due to this factor.  
 
According to the results shown in section 2 the gender wage gap shrunk between 1993 and 
1997, and increase thereafter. This pattern shows up in the results of the decompositions as 
an equalizing change on the wage distribution in panel A, and an unequalizing change in 
panel B. However (i) the size of these effects is small, and (ii) the impact on the household 
income distribution becomes non-significant. This latter result is likely the consequence of 
working women being disproportionally located in the upper part of the household income 
distribution.  
 
The most relevant change among those considered in the Table is the increase in the 
dispersion of unobservables. That effect alone accounts for an increase of more than 3 Gini 
points in the distribution of wages between 1993 and 1997, 3 points between 1997 and 
                                                 
10 Inequality changes may not coincide exactly with those reported in Table 3.1, since individuals (and their 
families) with missing information in any of the independent variables of the wage equation models are 
dropped.  2002 in urban areas, and 2 points in rural areas. The impact on the equivalized household 
income distribution is smaller, although still quite relevant.  
 
The regression for rural areas in Table 2.7 suggests significant regional changes between 
1997 and 2002, which basically implies a reduction in the wage gap between several 
regions and Santa Cruz. These changes are reflected in a relatively large equalizing effect 
on the income distribution in rural areas, since Santa Cruz is a relatively rich region.  
 
Changes in the educational structure of the population can modify the distribution of wages 
and earnings, and in turn the distribution of household income, through several channels. 
Suppose that during a given period of time a group of individuals change their educational 
status from primary complete to college complete, and correspondingly the distribution of  
expected wages change for them. The increase in wages for those individuals will certainly 
tend to reduce poverty. The effect of this education upgrading on inequality is ambiguous. 
To illustrate the point with an extreme example, suppose that previous to the shift all the 
population were in the primary complete group. The shift will then be clearly unequalizing. 
In the other extreme if people who become more educated were the only left in the primary 
education group and the rest of the population were in the college group the change will be 
equalizing.
11 A second channel could be important: given that the within dispersion of 
wages usually differ across educational groups, the change in the educational structure will 
affect overall within-inequality. Finally, there is an indirect effect of education on wages, 
which could be very important in the medium or long run: an increase in the supply of 
skilled workers contribute to a fall in the wage premium for that group, lowering the 
dispersion in wages and earnings.   
 
In Table 3.3 the adult population is classified into five educational groups. The proportion 
of adults with less than primary education is very high, although has decreased over time. 
The share of those with a secondary and college education (non technical) has increased 
over the analyzed period. The reduction of the non-education group and the increase in the 
college group probably imply an unequalizing effect. However, since there are other 
changes in the distribution of education, the final distributional effect is not clear. The 
microsimulations allow us to better assess this point. The results of Table 3.2 suggest that 
the effect of changes in the educational structure was unequalizing. The size of that effect is 
modest between 1993 and 1997, large in urban areas between 1997 and 2002, and small in 
rural areas. The educational upgrading in urban areas in Bolivia in the late 90s can account 
for 1 extra Gini point of wage inequality and 1.5 Gini points of household income 
inequality.  
 
It is interesting to notice that the sum of all effects considered in the paper account for an 
increase in inequality greater than the actual change, which means that factors not 
considered in the analysis may have played a relevant equalizing role. 
 
Summing up, changes in the returns to education were an equalizing factor in the early 90s 
and an unequalizing although minor factor thereafter. Changes in the gender wage gap did 
not significantly affect household inequality. In contrast, the increase in the returns to 
                                                 
11 These changes were behind Kuznets (1955) explanation of the so-called Kuznets curve.  unobserved worker characteristics has played a very significant unequalizing role over the 
last 10 years. Changes in regional wage gaps have played an equalizing role, especially in 
rural areas. Finally changes in the education structure have been mildly unequalizing.  
 
Given the results of this section regarding the relevance of the returns to formal education 
and the endowment of unobservable factors in accounting for the changes in income 
inequality, the next section will deepen into the analysis of these factors by using quantile 
regression analysis.   
 
3.3. Decomposing distributional changes with quantile regression  
 
The quantile regression estimates are used to enrich the decomposition analysis.
12 Instead 
of estimating a single β and simulating the distributional impact of its change, by using 
quantile regressions we can estimate a family of β(θ) and find the counterfactual 
distribution when the whole family of βs change. Also, we can make the decomposition 
analysis separately for changes in each of the β(θ). This procedure may provide a richer 
characterization of past changes in the income distribution, as well as a richer 
characterization of future distributional changes generated by economic and social changes 
or policy interventions. Additionally when simulating changes in the educational structure, 
we can simulate the new individual wage from upgrading education according to the wage-
education profile of the particular quantile to which the individual “belongs”.  
 
Let  ) ( ˆ θ βt  be the estimated parameters of the wage equation in time t. Individual i’s wage 
can be expressed as  
 
(3.6)                                                 ) ( ) ( ˆ '
j it j t it it X w θ µ θ β + =   
 
where j=1,...,J indexes the quantiles. Notice that wit can be expressed in relation to any of 
the J quantiles with a different error µit for each alternative expression.  
 
Now define  
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it defines the quantile for which the regression line is closest to the individual actual 
observation. We can write   
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We propose the following counterfactual wage of i in t1 if parameters βs were those of time 
t2 
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We are assuming that in time t1 individual i  “belongs” to the θ
*
i1th quantile of the 
conditional distribution of w, and then we apply the time t2 parameters βs corresponding to 
that quantile. We then add the error in t1 as we want to keep this term fixed.  
 
The interpretation is the following. Suppose the wage w is a function of formal education X, 
which is observable by the analyst, and by innate talent and pure chance, which are 
unobservable. The effect of formal education on wages depends on ability but not on 
chance. Suppose we believe there are J groups of ability and estimate J quantile 
regressions. We assume that i belongs to the θth group of ability if its actual wage is 
“similar” to the predicted one for the θth regression given i’s observable education Xi. The 
difference between the actual wage and the prediction is attributed to the effect of pure 
chance.  
 
Suppose that for some reason the way education and talent affect wages changes between 
time t1 and t2, which causes the family of parameters βs to change. To simulate individual 
i’s new wage we assume that she will remain in the same θth group of ability, and that she 
will be equally lucky than before. In particular the effect of luck on the wage will be the 
same as before. This is the intuition behind equation (3.9).  
 
Of course the partition of unobservables between talent, which is modeled through 
quantiles, and luck, which is left as the residual is completely arbitrary. In the limit we can 
estimate enough quantile regression so that the residual µ disappears. However, we find this 
alternative (i) computationally more cumbersome, and (ii) intuitively less compelling.   
 
Given the exploratory character of the decompositions by quantile regression we limit the 
empirical analysis to just the returns to education using the model specification 1. Table 3.4 
shows the results in terms of the Gini coefficient. Compared to the results obtained by OLS, 
the effect on income inequality of the changes in the returns to education appears to be 
magnified by using quantile estimations. While the fall in the returns to education between 
1993 and 1997 accounts for a drop of 1 Gini point using OLS, the fall is 2.5 Gini points by 
using quantile regression. During 1997 and 2002 the returns to education increased, a fact 
that contributed to increase wage and household income inequality. While with OLS 
estimations the impact on inequality was just 0.2 Gini points, the effect grows to 1 point 
with quantile estimates. Finally, in rural areas the distributional impact of the changes in the 
returns to education between 1997 and 2002 is estimated as negligible by OLS, and 
significantly unequalizing by quantile regression.  
 
The differences between OLS and quantile regression results may, at least in part, be 
explained by the following argument. Recall for instance that even when the mean return to 
secondary and college education increased between 1997 and 2002, the returns for the 
bottom quantiles of the conditional wage distribution actually decreased. When using OLS 
for simulating wages on the 1997 population with the parameters of 2002, we assign higher 
returns to all individuals with high school or college education. Instead, when using 
quantile regression we assign a higher return only to those workers in the upper quantiles of the conditional wage distribution, who are likely also located in the upper quantiles of the 
unconditional wage distribution. Therefore, the unequalizing effect of this change is likely 
to be greater.   
 
4.  Simulating economic and policy changes  
In this section we carry out some simple simulations to provide estimates of the 
distributional impact of different growth scenarios. In particular we are interested in 
assessing the potential impact of different policy changes in helping to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing poverty by half between 1990 and 
2015.  
 
The starting point is the observed income distribution in 2002. We postulate several 
impulses and trace their impact onto three dimensions of the income distribution: the mean 
(growth), the income dispersion (inequality), and the mass below a certain cut-off income 
point (poverty). It should be stressed that these are rather statistical exercises, where after a 
proposed impulse, all parameters and individual characteristics are kept constant.  
 
4.1. Growth and inequality: some mechanical exercises 
 
We start with some mechanical exercises in which we consider alternative growth rates in 
per capita income and assume an invariant distribution (except for the increase in the 
mean). Table 4.1 shows statistics for the resulting income distributions in 2015 of 
simulating five different annual growth rates (g): 1%, 3%, 5%, 6.5% and 8%. For each case 
we report the mean income of the distribution, along with ten widespread inequality 
indicators, and three poverty measures, both for moderate and extreme poverty, and also 
separately for urban and rural areas.
13  
 
The results of Table 4.1 on mean income and inequality are trivial, given the nature of the 
exercise. More interesting are the results on poverty. According to these exercises growing 
at an annual rate of 1% for the next 13 years with no changes in the income distribution 
would reduce poverty and extreme poverty in Bolivia, as measured by the headcount ratio, 
in around 5 points, which would certainly fall short of the MDG. The impact would be even 
more modest in rural areas with a fall of around 3 percentage points. Obviously, a higher 
annual growth rate has a greater impact on poverty. The national headcount ratio could be 
reduced to 50% with an annual growth rate of 3% and to 40% if the Bolivian economy 
could grow at 5% until year 2015.   
 
The MDGs propose halving poverty between 1990 and 2015. Unfortunately, Bolivia does 
not have reliable statistics on poverty for the early 90s, since the household surveys were 
not nationally representative by that time. By extrapolating changes in poverty for the main 
urban areas between 1992 to 1997, and for the whole country between 1997 and 2002, we 
estimate that the headcount ratio in the early 90s would have been just 3 points higher than 
                                                 
13 See Cowell (1995) and Lambert (1993) for definitions and explanations of these measures.  in 2002. As Table 4.1 shows, we estimate income poverty for 2002 in 65.1%.
14 That 
implies that the MDG for Bolivia would be a national poverty headcount ratio of around 
34% by 2015. With an invariant income distribution that goal could be met if the economy 
grew at an annual rate of 6.5% for the next 13 years, which seems to be an ambitious 
scenario. The national headcount ratio would be decreased to 29% with an annual growth 
rate of 8%. However, notice that even in this case poverty in rural areas remains very high 
(54%), not reaching the MDGs of halving the headcount ratio.    
 
Table 4.2 shows the poverty-growth elasticities for each scenario. Each entry in the table 
represents the change in the headcount ratio (in percentage points) for each 1% growth in 
mean income. The “productivity” of growth in terms of poverty reduction is decreasing in 
the growth rate. The poverty impact of this distributional neutral economic growth is higher 
in urban than in rural areas, except when considering extreme poverty in scenarios of high 
economic growth. Figure 4.1 helps to understand this result by showing kernel estimates of 
the density functions for the distribution of household per capita income in urban and rural 
areas. The vertical lines represent the “average” poverty lines for each area. Notice that the 
mass around the poverty line in urban areas is larger than in rural areas. An increase in real 
income can be represented as a movement of the poverty line to the left with an invariant 
nominal income distribution. Notice from Figure 4.1 that a small shift of the poverty line to 
the left affects more people in urban areas than in rural areas. 
 
In Table 4.3 we model simple redistributive policies with no efficiency losses. In particular 
we assume a proportional income tax of rate t with an egalitarian distribution of the 
revenues.
15 Three tax rates are considered in the Table: t=.1, t=.2 and t=.3. These changes 
have no impact on mean income and a rather trivial effect on inequality. The impact on 
poverty are more interesting to analyze. Even with a high tax rate of 30% the headcount 
ratio would be far from the MDG (58%).
16 This result highlights an important point: given 
that Bolivia is not only a country with high poverty indicators, but also a poor country in 
terms of mean income, there are no large gains in terms of poverty from pure redistributive 
policies, at least of the form proposed in this exercise. Of course, it should be stressed again 
that these are just statistical exercises. It can be argued that even small redistributions are 
enough to help the poor to build capacities (e.g. education) and escape poverty. However, 
this kind of (certainly very relevant) exercises are out of the scope of this paper.  
 
Notice also that extreme poverty is more sensible than moderate poverty to the reditributive 
policies of the kind considered here, i.e that imply a lump-sum payment to people with 
income lower than the mean. A not-too-high income transfer is enough to drive many 




                                                 
14 This figure is a little higher than the official figure since we use income and not expenditures for rural 
areas. We follow this procedure in order to be able to apply the models developed in previous sections to 
estimate and predict earnings. 
15 Paes de Barro et al. (2002) have recently carried out similar exercises for LAC.  
16 Only with a rate of t=.55 Bolivia would meet the MDG. However, it is hard to imagine  such massive 
redistribution policy not having negative effects on accumulation and hence mean income. 
17 A rate of .5 will eliminate extreme poverty.  We also simulate the direct impact on the household per capita income distribution of an 
increase in the productivity of labor. As Table 4.4 shows an annual 1% rate of growth in 
earnings for all workers until 2015 would imply a fall of just 4 percentage points in the 
national poverty headcount ratio. An annual productivity growth of 5% implies a much 
greater impact: poverty will be reduced from 65.1% to 44.9% and extreme poverty from 
41.8% to 26.7% by 2015. In the two last columns we repeat these exercises but changing 
only earnings for those individuals for which we estimated wage regressions in section 2. 
Since in the following section we change variables only for these individuals and trace the 
distributional impact, it is important to assess how much we lose by ignoring income 
changes for the rest of the population. The results of Table 4.4 suggest that the loss would 
be rather small.   
 
In Table 4.5 we simulate a 5% annual growth in earnings for workers in each sector 
separately. The differential impact of the earnings increase depend on the number of poor 
people (and their incomes relative to the poverty line) working in each sector. From Table 
4.5 the impacts do not seem to differ substantially across sectors, except for the expected 
larger impact of an increase in the productivity of primary activities in rural areas.   
 
Figure 4.2 shows the resulting growth-incidence curves after a annual 5% increase in 
earnings in all sectors, in primary activities and in skilled-intensive service sectors. A 
growth-incidence curve shows the growth in household per capita income for each quantile 
of that distribution after a given perturbation. Generalized earnings growth is about neutral, 
pro-poor if it takes place in the primary sector, and pro-rich if it happens in the skilled-
intensive sectors.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the average individual growth rates in per capita household income 
computed for three groups: those below the extreme poverty line, those between the 
poverty line and the extreme poverty line and the non-poor. The average of the growth rates 
for the poor is proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003) as a measure of pro-poor growth. A 
5% increase in the productivity of labor in the primary sector implies a pro-poor growth 
rate of 2.6% (considering the extreme poverty line). It is interesting to compare the first two 
rows in Table 4.6 with the third one. An increase in productivity in the primary sector will 
imply higher household per capita income growth for the poor than for the rest of the 
population. This is not the case for the rest of the sectors, especially for the skilled-
intensive sectors (government and business).  
 
We also simulate a labor productivity increase in urban and rural areas separately to assess 
the potential impact on poverty of regional targeted policies. A 5% annual growth in 
earnings in urban areas reduces poverty in that area from 53% to 29.1%. A similar 
productivity increase in rural areas would reduce poverty from 85% to 70.9%. Table 4.7 
shows that the pro-poor growth rate of an earnings increase is higher in the rural areas. The 
growth-incidence curves in Figure 4.3 are illustrative of a higher impact on poverty for 
policies targeted in rural areas.  
 
In the next three sections we perform some less mechanical exercises. Instead of directly 
changing income (or earnings) we change their determinants: individual observable characteristics and the returns to those characteristics. For simplicity we compute the 
impact of each change in characteristics or returns only on the hourly earnings of each 
working person, and with this simulated wage we reconstruct household per capita income. 
To simulate wages we use the models in section 2 estimated both by OLS and quantile 
regression.  
 
4.2. Changes in individual characteristics  
 
In this section we change some selected individual characteristics - education, sector of 
activity, type of work and number of children - and assess their impact on the income 
distribution. For illustration purposes, take the case of education. We follow a 5-step 
procedure.  
 
1.  Propose a change in the education structure of the population. Potential scenarios are 
generated by extrapolating actual trends and/or by considering policy goals. 
2.  Change individual education to replicate the target structure of step 1. Changes are 
made in a “natural” order. If we propose a new scenario with a larger college group, we 
draw the new college-educated workers from the former secondary-complete workers.  
3.  Predict wages for those individuals whose education was changed in step 2. For this 
step we classify workers into household heads and non-heads, and living in urban or 
rural areas and use the relevant regression to predict wages. We alternatively use OLS 
and quantile regression models, and predict wages following the procedure described in 
section 3. We restrict the analysis to those individuals in the sample used to run the 
Mincer regressions of section 2.  
4.  Reconstruct earnings and household per capita income with the new information.  




Table 4.8 shows the 2002 distribution of workers into the 6 educational categories 
considered. The first scenario (s1) is the consequence of extrapolating trends in the 90s to 
2015.
18 The second scenario (s2) is generated by assuming an acceleration of the 90s 
trends. The last two scenarios are ambitious policy objectives of eliminating illiteracy, 
substantially increasing primary school completion, and increasing high school and college 
attendance.  
 
The distributional results of microsimulating these changes are shown in Table 4.9. The 
income distribution does not seem to substantially vary after the simulated changes in the 
educational structure of the working population. Mean income grows less than 1 percentage 
point in scenarios 1 and 2, and a rather modest 5% and 6% in the two last more ambitious 
educational scenarios. Income inequality decreases very slowly as we alter the educational 
structure. As a consequence of these changes in mean income and inequality the simulated 
decrease in poverty turns out to be very modest. The national poverty headcount ratio 
would fall just ½ point if the educational trends of the 90s continue in the next decade. A 
                                                 
18 In the steady state this scenario would be consistent with the policy objective of increasing the primary 
school completion rate from around 70% to around 90%.  more ambitious educational upgrading would not generate spectacular distributional 
outcomes either. For instance, poverty would fall just 3 points in the scenario s4, clearly 
falling short of the MDG. Impacts are just a little bit greater for rural extreme poverty but 
still disappointing. Qualitative results are similar using different poverty indicators. Also 
OLS and quantile regression yield similar results, as it was expected from the analysis of 
section 2.   
 
Table 4.10 may help clarifying the perhaps surprising result of a minor distributional 
impact of the educational upgrading. The Table shows the working population aged 30 to 
50 in urban areas classified by education. Column (iii) reproduces the resulting educational 
structure under scenario s4. Even after a sizeable change in the educational structure the 
average wage just grows 8%, which suggest a minor impact on poverty. The impact would 
be in fact even more modest due to at least two factors.  
 
First, recall that extreme poverty in urban areas is around 26%. Assume that household 
income is perfectly correlated with worker’s education and hence, from Table 4.10, that 
those with no education and with primary incomplete are the ones below the extreme 
poverty line in 2002. An educational upgrading that moves some workers with primary 
incomplete to primary complete would not have a big impact on poverty, since the wage 
premium of finishing primary schools seems to be small as discussed in section 2.  
 
Second, the correlation between education and other wage determinants may further reduce 
the potential impact of an educational upgrading. Suppose all primary-incomplete workers 
were women, where in the primary–complete half were men and half women. An 
educational upgrading would drive women to the primary-complete group. If as data 
suggests women earn less than men, the new primary-complete workers would earn less 
than the average of that group previous to the educational upgrading. This fact implies a 
lower impact on poverty than Table 4.10 suggests. The example is obviously unrealistic. 
However, it is true that education and gender are highly correlated: 49% of workers in 
Table 4.10 with primary incomplete are women, while nearly 70% of those with primary 
complete are men. Also, men with primary complete earn 20% more than women with the 
same educational degree.  
 
A third potential source of a reduced impact of educational upgrading on poverty would 
arise if the returns to education were flatter for the lower conditional quantiles. In that case 
the impact of an educational upgrading would be lower for workers with low values of 
unobserved characteristics, who are also those more likely to be close or below the poverty 
line.
19 This effect, however, does not seem to be present from the results of Table 4.10, as a 
consequence of the results obtained by OLS being similar to those obtained by quantile 
regression.  
 
                                                 
19 The average quantile in the wage regressions for workers belonging to the poorest decile of the household 
per capita income distribution is 0.30 in urban areas. The corresponding average quantiles for those in decile 5 
and 10 are .46 and .68, respectively. In rural areas the values are .17, .43 and .62 for deciles 1, 5 and 10, 
respectively.   Tables 4.11 to 4.13 investigate the relationship between poverty and growth after the 
impulse of an educational upgrading. A change in the educational structure modifies 
incomes for some people, which in turn is reflected in mean income growth and poverty 
changes. Growth and poverty are then “dependent variables” in this exercise. Hence, 
poverty-growth elasticities should be seen as just correlations of the change in income and 
poverty as the economy is perturbed by an impulse. In Table 4.11 we report these 
elasticities for the 4 simulations of changes in the educational structure.  
 
The growth-incidence curves of Figure 4.4 suggest a minor and uniform impact of scenario 
s1, and a larger and inverse-U shaped impact of scenario s4. Mean growth rates for 
different income groups are presented in Table 4.12. In this case we report the total growth 
(and not the annual growth rate) from comparing the distribution before and after the 
change in the educational structure. The pro-poor growth rate is just above 1% in scenario 
s1, and a still modest 8% in scenario s4.  
 
In Table 4.13 we perform a Datt-Ravallion decomposition of the change in poverty by 
microsimulating the income distribution if only the mean changed after a given shock. In 
the simulation s4 the national poverty rate falls around 3 points: 2 of them are the “result” 
of changes in the mean of the distribution, while 1 extra point comes from a more equal 
distribution generated by the new educational scenario.  
 
Sector of activity  
 
We simulate 4 scenarios regarding the sectoral structure of employment (see Table 4.14). 
The first one (s1) extrapolates changes occurred in the 90s into the next decade. The second 
one (s2) proposes a change in employment from primary activities to the manufacturing 
industry, the third scenario envisions an increase in the manufacturing industry and skilled-
labor intensive services (government, education, business), while the last one also includes 
an increase in commerce. This latter increase tries to capture an increase in employment 
related to tourism, recommended in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (UDAPE, 2003).   
 
The results of the microsimulations (see Table 4.15) suggest very modest impacts of 
sectoral changes on the income distribution, and in particular on poverty. For instance, in 
scenario s4 the reduction in national poverty would be just 1 point, and the drop in rural 
extreme poverty just 2 points. Table 4.16 may help explaining these results. Wages in the 
manufacturing industry are not significantly higher than in primary activities, while the 
wage gap with commerce is not large. Wages in the skilled-labor intensive sectors are 
substantially higher but the proposed scenarios imply modest increases in the size of this 
s e c t o r .  I n  T a b l e  4 . 1 6  t h e  a v e r a g e  w a g e  o f  t h e  s a m p l e  o f  w o r k e r s  a g e d  3 0  t o  5 0  j u s t  
increases 2% after the employment reallocation proposed in s4.  
 
Sectoral reallocations per se would not imply a large effect on poverty. Poor workers have 
low education and likely low values of unobserved characteristics. If they move to the 
manufacturing sector or the commerce sector they would likely not end up with significant 
higher wages. The move to the skilled-intensive sector would probably have a similar 
outcome: although on average a worker aged 30 to 50 earns 4.4 times more in the services 
sector than in the  primary sector, a primary school drop-out worker earns on average just 35% more in the skilled-labor intensive sectors than in primary activities. For most workers 
that 35% is not enough to drive them out of poverty.  
 
The growth-incidence curves are decreasing in income for all scenarios (see Figure 4.4). 
The less pro-poor is s2 -i.e a change from primary activities to the manufacturing industry-, 
while the most pro-poor is scenario s4 with an increase in industry, commerce and services 
(see also Table 4.17). However, recall that even in that case the national headcount ratio 
just falls 1 point. Table 4.18 shows that this increase is basically due to a growth effect 




Informality is a big issue in Latin American labor markets. Most workers do not have 
access to a stable well-paid job with labor and social protection. In Bolivia most workers 
are informal, either wage-earners in small firms, or most of them self-employed. 
Informality has increased in the second half of the 90s in urban areas but decreased in rural 
areas. We project these changes in scenario s1 (see Table 4.19). We also propose studying 
scenarios where formal employment grows from a reduction in self-employment (s2), in 
informal salaried workers (s3), and a combination of both (s4).  
 
As in previous exercises the impact of these changes on incomes, and hence on poverty, is 
very small (see Table 4.20): the reduction in the national poverty headcount ratio is less 
than 2 points in the most ambitious scenario (s4). To understand this result, notice that even 
when the average wage for formal workers is almost double the wage of the self-employed, 
for those with incomplete primary school the wage gap is just 4%.  
 
In all scenarios the resulting growth is pro-poor (see Table 4.21). Mean household per 
capita income grows around 7% for those below the extreme poverty line, and 5% for those 
below the poverty line under scenario s4.  
 
Demographics: number of children  
 
The number of children affects household per capita income in a trivial way, by increasing 
the denominator. This demographic factor can also affect the labor decisions of some 
members of the household, typically the mother, and the future net income of the parents 
through transfers to and from their children when they grow up. In this section we simulate 
3 scenarios regarding the number of children under 12 in each household and trace the 
direct impact on the household per capita income distribution (i.e we compute the effect of 
more children only through the effect on the denominator of household per capita income). 
Table 4.22 shows three alternative scenarios. As usual, the first one follows the observed 
patterns in the 90s. We propose to study other two cases where the proportion of household 
with a small number of children goes up. In all scenarios inequality and poverty is reduced 
from their current levels (Table 4.23). Although the equalizing and poverty-reducing effects 
are larger than in the previous exercises, they are still quite small.  
 4.3. Changes in the returns to individual characteristics  
 
In this section we investigate the potential distributional effect change in the returns to 
worker characteristics: formal education, sector of activity, gender, race, and labor 
informality.  
 
Returns to education  
 
The returns to formal education has deserved a lot of attention both by the research 
community and in the policy arena. Part of this relevance is due to the observability of 
variables related to formal education in surveys and census, and its suitability as a policy 
instrument, compared to other income determinants like responsibility, work ethics, on-the-
job-training, innate talent, or labor market contacts. In this section we assume some 
changes in the returns to education in terms of hourly wages and trace their impact on the 
household income distribution. Table 4.24 shows the results for 5 types of simulations. In 
scenario s1 all returns are increased 20%. This increase for instance can be related to 
changes in the school quality achieved by changing the class size, improving teachers 
education or spending more resources in class material.
20 We investigate the effect of 
changing the mean return by using OLS estimates, and of increasing by 20% the returns to 
education in all quantiles of the conditional wage distribution by using quantile regression 
estimates. This scenario implies an increasing wage gap between the unskilled and the 
skilled, since a proportional increase in the returns implies larger gains for the latter group. 
In scenario s2 we reinforce this pattern by increasing the returns to completing primary 
school by 10%, of having some high school education by 20%, of completing secondary 
school by 30%, and of having some college education by 40%. Instead, scenario s3 
assumes increases in the returns that are decreasing in the educational level: 40% for 
primary school (both incomplete and complete), 20% for secondary school and no changes 
for college.
21 For simplicity, we report only the results estimated by OLS. In scenario s4 the 
returns of the conditional quantiles below the median are equalized to the returns of the 
median. If differences in quantiles are mainly due to different education quality, this 
scenario would take place after an effort by the government of increasing quality in the 
schools of lowest quality. Scenario s5 is more radical, since it assumes that all returns 
collapse to the median returns. A movement toward this scenario could be generated by 
some redistributive policy that for instance takes resources from the best schools to 
subsidize less-favored schools, trying to attain equalization of education quality across 
schools (public and private).  
 
The effect of these changes on the income distribution (see Table 4.24) are again of a small 
size. As expected, income inequality increases in scenarios s1 and s2, and decreases in the 
other three cases. However, all the computed changes are quite small. For instance the Gini 
coefficient in the more radical scenario s5 decreases just 1 point. All simulated changes are 
                                                 
20 Of course the increase of 20% is arbitrary, although it seems a value that is reasonable to expect from, for 
instance, estimates of the increase in the returns to education from reducing the class size (see Arias et al., 
2002). 
21 In rural areas all returns but those for college are increased by 40% to avoid the return of primary education 
being higher than the return of high school.  poverty-reducing, although the impact is modest: the headcount ratio drops around 2 points 
in most microsimulations. Results do not significantly vary as we change the estimation 
method (see columns (ii) and (iii)).  
 
Figure 4.5 shows growth-incidence curves for scenarios s1 to s4, while Table 4.25 compute 
the average growth rates for income groups. The maximum rate of pro-poor growth is 4.6% 
in scenario s3. As expected the rate of pro-poor growth is higher than the aggregate growth 
rate in scenarios s3 to s5. Poverty-growth elasticities (Table 4.26) are higher in urban than 
in rural areas. As it is shown in Table 4.27 the poverty reduction attained in scenarios s1 to 
s3 is mainly due to a growth effect. Instead, in cases s4 and s5 the redistributive component 
is the dominant one.  
 
Gender, race and formality  
 
As it was shown in section 2, being female, being Spanish not the first language, or 
working in the informal sector reduce hourly wages, other things equal. In this section we 
simulate the household per capita income distribution resulting from eliminating this 
differential treatment. For instance, for the case of gender (s1), we set in zero the 
coefficient of the male dummy in the wage equations, and increase the constant in the value 
of that coefficient. This procedure implies closing the gender wage gap. We proceed in the 
same way for the race dummy. For the case of formality we fix in zero the coefficients for 
informal wage earners and the self-employed.
22 For each scenario, we report the results 
obtained using both OLS and quantile regression.  
 
As expected all the simulations imply higher per capita income. Closing the gender wage 
gap does not decrease household inequality. Even when women earn less than men, 
working women are not disproportionally located in the bottom part of the household 
income distribution. Closing the wage gap due to race and informality does reduce 
inequality, although by a small amount. All simulations imply a reduction in poverty, 
although the effects are rather small. The biggest impact would be to increase wages of the 
informal workers to the level of the formal workers (controlling for other characteristics). 
That change would reduce the national poverty headcount ratio by 5 points. Figure 4.6 and 
Table 4.29 show that changing the treatment to non-Spanish speakers and especially to 
informal workers in terms of wages would clearly benefit the poor relative to the rich, a 
conclusion that is not applied to gender.   
 
Some interactions      
 
So far, we have analyzed changes in worker characteristics and changes in the returns to 
those characteristics separately. Of course, in general equilibrium we expect that quantities 
and prices move in a consistent way. For instance, if the government runs an education 
program that is successful in increasing the educational level of a fraction of the population, 
it is likely that the structure of returns to education changes. Table 4.30 shows the results of 
simulating two scenarios that take interaction effects into account. In case s1 we combine 
the educational upgrading of scenario s2 in Table 4.8 with a 5% fall in the returns to 
                                                 
22 In the quantile regressions we keep the original coefficients if they are positive.  education. We do the calculations using both OLS and quantile regression estimates of the 
wage equations coefficients. In the case s2 we restrict the drop in returns to the lowest 4 
quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. The argument is that the increase in the 
number of students may especially crowd the worst schools, and thus mainly affect the 
students who were already attending those schools (likely those students in the bottom 
quantiles). As expected the introduction of these interactions reduce (and in some cases 
totally eliminates) the already small poverty-reduction effects of the educational upgrading 
(Table 4.30). The pro-poor growth rate of the educational upgrading s2 is reduced from 
around 3% (see table 4.12) to 2% if we consider the likely fall in the returns to education.  
 
4.4. An assessment 
 
The microsimulations of this section are useful instrument to assess the potential impact of 
some economic and social policy changes. However, they have several shortcomings that 
suggest taking the results of this section with prudence. We restrict the analysis to labor 
income, we consider the effect of different changes only on wages and not on hours worked 
and employment, and moreover we restrict the analysis to a particular subsample. Second, 
these exercises do not consider interactions seriously. General equilibrium considerations 
surely introduce indirect effects not considered in the simulations, and in some cases they 
may actually revert some results. Third, policy interventions do not have a clear counterpart 
in the assumed scenarios, so we cannot answer questions on the distributional impact of a 
specific policy measure. Despite these limitations we believe that the microsimulations are 
a valuable instrument to learn about the likely sign and order of magnitude of the effect that 
some economic changes and policy measures may have on the income distribution, 
particularly on inequality and poverty.  
 
From the analysis of this section we conclude that in most reasonable scenarios poverty can 
be reduced only slightly. Although increasing education, promoting the manufacturing 
industry and some skilled-intensive sectors, reducing labor informality and fertility will all 
have poverty-reducing effects, the magnitude of these effects appears to be quite small. 
That is also the case for a 20% increase in the returns to education, and to the closing of the 
wage gap between male and women, races or types of work (formal and informal). Pure 
redistributive measures attained by fiscal policy seems to be more effective in terms of 
poverty reduction. Probably the main lesson from this section is that in a poor country like 
Bolivia, only sustainable economic growth can have a substantial impact on poverty. In the 
simulations of this section the MDG of halving poverty by 2015 is reached only with an 
annual growth rate of 6.5%, which means more than duplicating per capita income by 2015.  
 
Measures that imply changing the educational or sectoral structure of the population, or that 
imply a once-and-for-all change in the returns to education seems to have only modest 
effects on poverty. Of course, these changes may contribute to the economic growth 
identified as the key for reaching the MDGs, and even may be the main channels for 
promoting growth, but studying these links is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
4.  Concluding remarks  This paper uses microeconometric simulations to assess the relevance of different factors in 
accounting for income inequality changes in Bolivia during the last decade, and to evaluate 
the likely impact of different scenarios on the future income distribution. The paper 
identifies the substantial increase in the dispersion of unobserved worker characteristics as 
the main factor behind the increase in inequality in the 90s. After assessing the 
distributional impact of different economic scenarios the paper highlights the fact that 
without a sustainable and persistent increase in productivity it seems difficult that Bolivia 
could reach the MDG by 2015. Although increasing education, encouraging sector 
reallocations, reducing fertility, closing the wage gap by race, gender and labor formality, 
and increasing the returns to education contribute to reducing poverty, if they do not foster 
sustainable economic growth their impact on poverty would be only modest. Economic 
growth seems to be a necessary condition for reducing poverty in Bolivia.  References  
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Table 2.1 
Characteristics of household surveys  
   Does the survey report 
Name Coverage Sample size Non-labor Non-monetary
Individuals income? income? 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1993 EIH Urban 20,160 yes no
1997 ENE National 36,752 yes no
2002 ECH National 24,933 yes yes
EIH: Encuesta Integrada de Hogares / ENE: Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
ECH: Encuesta Continua de Hogares (MECOVI)  
 
Table 2.2  
Log wage equations 
OLS and quantile regression estimates  
Household heads in urban areas 
Bolivia, 2002 
OLS
Estimates q = 0.1  q = 0.2  q = 0.3  q = 0.4  q = 0.5  q = 0.6  q = 0.7  q = 0.8  q = 0.9 
Primary Incomplete 0.295 0.057 0.297 0.274 0.201 0.290 0.315 0.193 0.252 0.340
(2.81)** (0.24) (2.29)* (2.15)* (1.64) (2.56)* (2.39)* (1.28) (2.08)* (2.22)*
Primary Complete 0.295 0.067 0.220 0.215 0.234 0.322 0.313 0.230 0.295 0.481
(2.36)* (0.27) (1.50) (1.41) (1.64) (2.34)* (2.10)* (1.31) (2.08)* (2.63)**
Secondary Incomplete 0.462 0.201 0.401 0.429 0.318 0.415 0.412 0.356 0.430 0.599
(4.02)** (0.82) (2.76)** (3.22)** (2.41)* (3.39)** (2.88)** (2.16)* (3.05)** (3.30)**
Secondary Complete 0.491 0.129 0.385 0.413 0.346 0.465 0.477 0.395 0.469 0.646
(4.22)** (0.53) (2.58)** (3.03)** (2.63)** (3.52)** (3.28)** (2.41)* (3.38)** (3.66)**
College 1.100 0.604 0.953 1.071 1.021 1.185 1.254 1.189 1.303 1.381
(9.35)** (2.48)* (6.44)** (7.66)** (7.23)** (9.36)** (8.57)** (6.80)** (8.46)** (7.64)**
Age 0.054 0.058 0.065 0.061 0.058 0.062 0.037 0.042 0.033 0.052
(4.63)** (3.06)** (3.96)** (4.61)** (4.97)** (4.20)** (2.79)** (3.00)** (1.92) (2.34)*
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(4.13)** (3.16)** (3.71)** (4.12)** (4.41)** (3.63)** (2.13)* (2.38)* (1.48) (1.76)
Male 0.290 0.469 0.426 0.337 0.283 0.218 0.215 0.143 0.245 0.353
(5.46)** (4.63)** (5.08)** (4.38)** (4.01)** (2.99)** (3.60)** (1.99)* (3.08)** (3.25)**
Chuquisaca -0.310 -0.537 -0.402 -0.270 -0.190 -0.285 -0.164 -0.195 -0.120 -0.099
(3.50)** (2.41)* (2.42)* (1.90) (1.77) (2.55)* (1.50) (1.72) (1.15) (0.63)
La Paz -0.065 -0.174 -0.116 -0.049 0.002 -0.041 -0.019 -0.030 -0.025 -0.089
(1.13) (1.54) (1.43) (0.81) (0.03) (0.58) (0.34) (0.46) (0.35) (0.87)
Cochabamba -0.115 -0.174 -0.176 -0.049 -0.055 -0.104 -0.079 -0.103 -0.134 -0.102
(1.80) (1.65) (1.99)* (0.68) (0.76) (1.46) (1.14) (1.53) (1.84) (0.82)
Oruro -0.294 -0.415 -0.406 -0.358 -0.299 -0.303 -0.293 -0.298 -0.236 -0.176
(3.94)** (3.02)** (3.57)** (3.81)** (3.39)** (3.44)** (3.72)** (3.24)** (2.11)* (1.23)
Potosi -0.174 -0.143 -0.050 -0.074 -0.108 -0.175 -0.214 -0.302 -0.238 -0.205
(2.30)* (1.11) (0.56) (1.11) (1.33) (2.21)* (3.04)** (4.09)** (1.80) (1.46)
Tarija 0.037 0.018 -0.015 0.101 0.029 -0.041 -0.040 -0.063 -0.041 0.075
(0.50) (0.17) (0.18) (1.39) (0.42) (0.54) (0.57) (0.84) (0.44) (0.51)
Beni 0.043 -0.014 0.039 0.104 0.075 0.005 0.057 0.052 0.091 -0.074
(0.55) (0.12) (0.33) (1.29) (0.87) (0.05) (0.66) (0.51) (1.01) (0.54)
Pando 0.167 0.188 0.144 0.181 0.309 0.101 0.096 0.081 -0.024 0.258
(1.08) (0.64) (0.84) (1.21) (2.13)* (0.75) (0.70) (0.39) (0.08) (0.96)
Manufacturing industry 0.227 0.644 0.405 0.143 0.080 0.066 0.069 0.061 -0.028 -0.026
(3.20)** (3.69)** (3.10)** (1.41) (1.11) (0.75) (0.84) (0.69) (0.27) (0.21)
Utilities and transportation 0.361 0.740 0.421 0.156 0.124 0.179 0.218 0.227 0.180 0.190
(4.77)** (4.25)** (3.22)** (1.53) (1.53) (1.82) (2.48)* (2.23)* (1.54) (1.21)
Construction 0.383 0.945 0.670 0.402 0.334 0.280 0.240 0.163 -0.020 -0.086
(5.15)** (5.58)** (5.08)** (3.80)** (4.86)** (3.92)** (3.60)** (2.25)* (0.22) (0.76)
Commerce 0.223 0.635 0.358 0.085 0.053 0.003 0.062 0.039 0.072 0.217
(3.17)** (3.61)** (2.72)** (0.81) (0.74) (0.04) (0.77) (0.39) (0.68) (1.49)
Government and business 0.456 0.897 0.615 0.330 0.331 0.292 0.277 0.225 0.172 0.314
(6.41)** (5.26)** (4.60)** (3.15)** (4.00)** (3.38)** (3.32)** (2.45)* (1.43) (2.54)*
Informal salaried workers -0.339 -0.261 -0.253 -0.237 -0.239 -0.251 -0.271 -0.331 -0.336 -0.251
(5.68)** (3.11)** (3.36)** (4.02)** (4.70)** (4.69)** (5.11)** (5.57)** (4.87)** (2.66)**
Self-employed -0.206 -0.399 -0.383 -0.289 -0.224 -0.127 -0.073 -0.087 -0.025 0.107
(4.56)** (4.96)** (6.17)** (5.63)** (4.64)** (2.25)* (1.53) (1.54) (0.36) (1.11)
First Language Spanish 0.170 0.089 0.142 0.173 0.204 0.220 0.238 0.193 0.166 0.133
(3.77)** (1.12) (2.41)* (3.80)** (4.70)** (4.66)** (5.56)** (3.74)** (2.86)** (1.57)
Constant -0.680 -1.699 -1.527 -1.074 -0.764 -0.695 -0.148 0.183 0.475 0.117
(2.63)** (3.70)** (4.64)** (3.78)** (3.01)** (2.20)* (0.51) (0.56) (1.29) (0.25)
Observations 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Quantile Regression Estimates
  
Table 2.3  
Log wage equations 
OLS and quantile regression estimates  
Household heads in rural areas 
Bolivia, 2002 
OLS
Estimates q = 0.1  q = 0.2  q = 0.3  q = 0.4  q = 0.5  q = 0.6  q = 0.7  q = 0.8  q = 0.9 
Primary Incomplete 0.112 -0.023 0.039 -0.027 0.066 0.109 0.180 0.243 0.243 0.339
(1.25) (0.20) (0.33) (0.23) (0.63) (1.00) (1.55) (1.97)* (2.14)* (2.18)*
Primary Complete 0.212 -0.011 0.220 0.154 0.081 0.219 0.292 0.288 0.255 0.492
(1.53) (0.05) (1.25) (0.87) (0.52) (1.16) (1.58) (1.61) (1.39) (1.99)*
Secondary Incomplete 0.254 0.148 0.363 0.212 0.140 0.207 0.376 0.411 0.362 0.441
(2.03)* (0.65) (2.10)* (1.31) (0.92) (1.24) (2.25)* (2.56)* (2.46)* (1.96)
Secondary Complete 0.131 0.156 0.319 0.105 0.041 0.085 0.190 0.235 0.161 0.282
(0.85) (0.65) (1.75) (0.61) (0.25) (0.50) (1.11) (1.25) (0.81) (1.08)
College 0.822 0.828 1.029 0.776 0.686 0.864 0.944 0.943 0.827 0.999
(4.48)** (3.78)** (5.29)** (3.87)** (3.69)** (3.98)** (4.06)** (4.52)** (3.61)** (3.25)**
Age 0.062 0.061 0.065 0.070 0.070 0.056 0.059 0.033 0.028 0.029
(3.86)** (2.65)** (3.30)** (3.53)** (3.02)** (2.38)* (2.55)* (1.66) (1.25) (0.99)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(3.65)** (2.49)* (3.13)** (3.42)** (2.99)** (2.35)* (2.58)** (1.56) (1.17) (0.90)
Male 0.274 0.568 0.333 0.338 0.386 0.252 0.065 0.095 0.126 -0.047
(3.02)** (4.04)** (2.62)** (2.65)** (3.03)** (1.75) (0.47) (0.94) (1.33) (0.30)
Chuquisaca -0.980 -0.863 -1.003 -1.122 -1.204 -0.943 -0.891 -0.974 -0.880 -0.775
(9.65)** (4.70)** (5.91)** (9.06)** (8.60)** (6.24)** (7.21)** (8.27)** (5.75)** (3.67)**
La Paz -0.214 -0.229 -0.301 -0.290 -0.188 -0.128 -0.188 -0.303 -0.245 -0.110
(2.17)* (1.35) (1.73) (2.40)* (1.54) (1.12) (1.50) (2.46)* (1.69) (0.49)
Cochabamba -0.668 -0.609 -0.865 -0.872 -0.755 -0.632 -0.573 -0.593 -0.538 -0.543
(6.66)** (3.64)** (5.22)** (7.19)** (5.71)** (5.04)** (3.97)** (4.56)** (4.26)** (2.68)**
Oruro -0.241 -0.022 -0.329 -0.271 -0.237 -0.211 -0.174 -0.284 -0.316 -0.254
(2.00)* (0.12) (1.79) (1.81) (1.88) (1.51) (1.02) (1.82) (1.72) (1.09)
Potosi -0.436 -0.478 -0.659 -0.526 -0.312 -0.335 -0.207 -0.379 -0.408 -0.343
(4.19)** (2.63)** (3.26)** (3.23)** (2.38)* (2.48)* (1.37) (3.11)** (2.88)** (1.67)
Tarija -0.170 0.166 -0.111 -0.300 -0.171 -0.129 -0.101 -0.205 -0.210 -0.347
(1.43) (0.92) (0.75) (2.11)* (1.30) (0.93) (0.65) (1.41) (1.40) (1.69)
Beni 0.226 0.455 0.258 0.062 0.109 0.280 0.308 0.154 0.120 0.254
(1.85) (2.51)* (1.72) (0.49) (0.77) (1.76) (1.80) (0.98) (0.69) (0.92)
Pando 0.644 0.855 0.768 0.595 0.638 0.653 0.777 0.680 0.635 0.489
(4.30)** (3.71)** (4.78)** (4.19)** (4.33)** (3.72)** (3.67)** (3.58)** (3.33)** (1.98)*
Manufacturing industry 0.656 0.970 0.820 0.588 0.624 0.513 0.378 0.410 0.359 0.545
(4.95)** (5.50)** (5.88)** (4.48)** (5.21)** (4.69)** (2.80)** (2.53)* (1.80) (2.04)*
Utilities and transportation 1.342 1.099 1.326 1.276 1.179 1.136 0.945 1.243 1.299 1.556
(8.76)** (3.30)** (5.18)** (7.03)** (7.11)** (6.11)** (3.76)** (4.60)** (4.04)** (3.10)**
Construction 0.882 1.074 0.999 1.041 0.984 0.915 0.772 0.760 0.630 0.489
(7.76)** (6.38)** (5.63)** (6.81)** (7.85)** (7.14)** (6.88)** (8.68)** (5.99)** (3.57)**
Commerce 1.158 1.317 1.075 1.206 1.263 1.185 1.079 1.005 0.967 0.971
(8.97)** (7.66)** (6.19)** (5.44)** (6.12)** (6.14)** (6.29)** (6.35)** (5.37)** (3.55)**
Government and business 0.680 1.026 0.679 0.718 0.674 0.497 0.480 0.617 0.633 0.351
(5.01)** (5.78)** (4.44)** (4.33)** (4.24)** (2.92)** (2.76)** (3.50)** (3.33)** (1.42)
Informal salaried workers 0.030 0.285 0.138 0.061 -0.040 -0.011 0.033 0.045 -0.036 -0.323
(0.28) (1.78) (1.05) (0.52) (0.32) (0.09) (0.28) (0.43) (0.32) (1.92)
Self-employed -0.611 -0.696 -0.691 -0.674 -0.726 -0.722 -0.598 -0.503 -0.436 -0.432
(8.68)** (5.46)** (6.45)** (6.63)** (7.61)** (7.50)** (6.41)** (5.44)** (4.06)** (2.87)**
First Language Spanish 0.248 0.236 0.232 0.275 0.229 0.225 0.208 0.163 0.085 0.165
(3.42)** (1.91) (2.22)* (3.15)** (2.62)** (2.56)* (2.48)* (2.19)* (0.95) (1.14)
Spouse -2.287 -1.643 -1.339 -1.162 -0.668 -0.383 0.311 0.622 1.055
(4.71)** (3.74)** (3.13)** (2.29)* (1.33) (0.81) (0.83) (1.33) (1.86)
Constant -0.849 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502
(2.46)*
Observations 1502
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Quantile Regression Estimates
 
 Table 2.4  
Log wage equations 
OLS and quantile regression estimates  
Non-household heads in urban areas 
Bolivia, 2002 
OLS
Estimates q = 0.1  q = 0.2  q = 0.3  q = 0.4  q = 0.5  q = 0.6  q = 0.7  q = 0.8  q = 0.9 
Primary Incomplete 0.007 -0.038 -0.053 0.041 0.141 0.006 0.037 0.129 0.027 0.005
(0.07) (0.29) (0.54) (0.38) (0.98) (0.05) (0.34) (1.03) (0.21) (0.03)
Primary Complete 0.150 0.128 0.133 0.275 0.326 0.154 0.171 0.294 0.212 -0.021
(1.23) (0.69) (0.94) (1.94) (1.94) (1.05) (1.31) (1.93) (1.38) (0.10)
Secondary Incomplete 0.247 0.182 0.130 0.225 0.294 0.210 0.186 0.287 0.199 0.335
(2.28)* (1.24) (1.09) (1.88) (1.88) (1.57) (1.52) (1.97)* (1.20) (1.35)
Secondary Complete 0.399 0.258 0.249 0.441 0.622 0.393 0.411 0.481 0.322 0.445
(3.58)** (1.70) (2.14)* (3.24)** (3.95)** (2.93)** (3.41)** (3.58)** (2.12)* (1.89)
College 0.883 0.659 0.665 0.932 1.065 0.904 1.031 1.199 1.067 1.112
(7.76)** (4.47)** (5.20)** (6.90)** (6.42)** (6.70)** (7.94)** (8.57)** (7.07)** (5.24)**
Age 0.034 0.049 0.058 0.056 0.043 0.040 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.016
(2.79)** (2.96)** (4.47)** (3.90)** (2.93)** (2.83)** (1.17) (1.18) (1.01) (0.76)
Age squared -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.87) (2.17)* (3.68)** (3.18)** (2.21)* (2.18)* (0.51) (0.38) (0.16) (0.44)
Male 0.292 0.200 0.279 0.276 0.286 0.373 0.316 0.324 0.324 0.290
(4.60)** (2.55)* (4.18)** (3.68)** (4.00)** (5.29)** (4.05)** (3.58)** (3.22)** (2.08)*
Spouse 0.251 -0.031 0.148 0.260 0.328 0.402 0.395 0.424 0.351 0.275
(3.92)** (0.33) (1.96) (3.35)** (4.08)** (5.21)** (4.87)** (4.99)** (4.20)** (2.28)*
Chuquisaca -0.307 -0.286 -0.394 -0.336 -0.240 -0.237 -0.227 -0.224 -0.346 -0.363
(3.43)** (2.24)* (3.27)** (2.62)** (2.07)* (2.57)* (2.42)* (2.60)** (4.22)** (1.80)
La Paz -0.206 -0.179 -0.247 -0.231 -0.181 -0.157 -0.100 -0.081 -0.119 -0.075
(3.36)** (1.61) (3.19)** (2.82)** (2.31)* (2.17)* (1.44) (1.02) (1.53) (0.64)
Cochabamba -0.229 -0.058 -0.202 -0.195 -0.237 -0.269 -0.215 -0.226 -0.230 -0.173
(3.42)** (0.50) (2.25)* (2.39)* (3.37)** (4.07)** (2.80)** (2.56)* (2.84)** (1.53)
Oruro -0.333 -0.414 -0.257 -0.334 -0.318 -0.324 -0.224 -0.265 -0.274 -0.184
(3.92)** (2.39)* (2.11)* (3.38)** (3.35)** (3.44)** (2.28)* (2.42)* (2.39)* (1.15)
Potosi -0.277 -0.017 -0.274 -0.286 -0.237 -0.238 -0.305 -0.328 -0.191 -0.244
(2.85)** (0.10) (2.68)** (2.40)* (2.18)* (2.85)** (3.20)** (2.51)* (1.45) (1.77)
Tarija -0.123 -0.039 -0.188 -0.174 -0.209 -0.126 -0.122 -0.073 -0.136 -0.113
(1.62) (0.37) (2.16)* (1.95) (2.11)* (1.45) (1.33) (0.78) (1.43) (0.78)
Beni -0.020 0.031 -0.039 -0.050 -0.086 -0.020 -0.006 -0.026 -0.014 -0.059
(0.25) (0.32) (0.35) (0.60) (0.96) (0.23) (0.07) (0.25) (0.13) (0.42)
Pando 0.166 0.249 0.086 0.016 -0.080 -0.091 -0.165 0.181 0.477 0.213
(0.82) (0.82) (0.44) (0.08) (0.43) (0.38) (0.52) (0.47) (1.15) (0.30)
Manufacturing industry 0.299 0.516 0.682 0.447 0.122 0.105 0.099 0.039 -0.041 0.105
(2.97)** (2.24)* (3.81)** (2.20)* (0.56) (0.69) (0.76) (0.28) (0.29) (0.60)
Utilities and transportatio0.512 0.729 0.867 0.712 0.432 0.384 0.285 0.293 0.201 0.172
(4.12)** (2.49)* (4.35)** (3.32)** (1.88) (2.27)* (1.90) (1.85) (1.20) (1.02)
Construction 0.604 1.203 1.200 0.966 0.611 0.413 0.341 0.206 0.010 -0.015
(5.09)** (4.89)** (6.49)** (4.81)** (2.75)** (2.84)** (2.83)** (1.50) (0.07) (0.08)
Commerce 0.506 0.713 0.781 0.648 0.310 0.268 0.245 0.215 0.163 0.321
(5.36)** (3.23)** (4.51)** (3.17)** (1.42) (1.86) (1.95) (1.51) (1.19) (1.85)
Government and busines0.518 0.943 0.957 0.741 0.367 0.288 0.216 0.141 0.113 0.177
(5.36)** (4.19)** (5.54)** (3.78)** (1.75) (2.09)* (1.73) (0.97) (0.75) (1.06)
Informal salaried workers-0.468 -0.390 -0.430 -0.455 -0.428 -0.450 -0.434 -0.359 -0.330 -0.373
(7.34)** (4.63)** (7.04)** (7.01)** (6.27)** (6.91)** (6.95)** (4.95)** (4.49)** (2.97)**
Self-employed -0.340 -0.615 -0.486 -0.443 -0.298 -0.305 -0.232 -0.163 -0.091 0.038
(6.21)** (7.19)** (6.46)** (5.66)** (4.14)** (5.20)** (3.93)** (2.65)** (1.21) (0.30)
First Language Spanish 0.082 0.058 0.008 0.016 0.052 0.073 0.114 0.173 0.213 0.200
(1.47) (0.58) (0.12) (0.25) (0.78) (1.19) (1.75) (2.54)* (3.20)** (1.86)
Constant -0.283 -1.504 -1.382 -1.140 -0.631 -0.257 0.214 0.222 0.637 0.980
(1.24) (4.19)** (5.08)** (3.75)** (2.02)* (1.02) (0.85) (0.72) (2.07)* (2.54)*
Observations 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Quantile Regression Estimates
 
 Table 2.5  
Log wage equations 
OLS and quantile regression estimates  
Non-household heads in rural areas 
Bolivia, 2002 
OLS
Estimates q = 0.1  q = 0.2  q = 0.3  q = 0.4  q = 0.5  q = 0.6  q = 0.7  q = 0.8  q = 0.9 
Primary Incomplete 0.146 0.127 0.115 -0.046 0.105 0.223 0.225 0.159 0.325 0.240
(0.81) (0.36) (0.45) (0.21) (0.50) (0.98) (0.89) (0.65) (1.44) (0.94)
Primary Complete 0.668 0.585 0.458 0.365 0.715 0.975 0.851 0.712 0.599 0.695
(2.84)** (1.39) (1.27) (1.16) (2.47)* (3.38)** (2.79)** (2.35)* (2.11)* (2.02)*
Secondary Incomplete 0.599 0.820 0.792 0.373 0.644 0.731 0.645 0.399 0.551 0.544
(2.49)* (1.60) (2.12)* (1.33) (2.63)** (2.87)** (2.35)* (1.41) (2.02)* (1.82)
Secondary Complete 0.764 0.400 0.752 0.589 0.709 0.788 0.867 1.120 1.354 1.135
(3.22)** (0.72) (2.11)* (2.25)* (2.99)** (3.01)** (2.74)** (3.53)** (4.19)** (3.14)**
College 1.318 1.180 1.075 1.000 1.341 1.399 1.583 1.664 1.849 1.818
(4.69)** (1.93) (2.57)* (2.87)** (4.28)** (4.88)** (5.47)** (5.53)** (5.75)** (4.51)**
Age 0.032 0.063 0.081 0.066 0.080 0.062 0.040 -0.008 -0.001 -0.010
(1.16) (1.39) (1.99)* (1.85) (2.31)* (1.78) (1.20) (0.22) (0.02) (0.28)
Age squared -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.67) (1.14) (1.60) (1.51) (1.74) (1.13) (0.73) (0.52) (0.45) (0.58)
Male 0.781 0.814 0.908 1.032 1.008 0.949 0.905 0.786 0.361 0.153
(4.77)** (2.46)* (3.61)** (4.88)** (4.94)** (4.83)** (4.35)** (3.23)** (1.36) (0.51)
Spouse 0.475 0.568 0.433 0.555 0.452 0.463 0.499 0.626 0.348 0.224
(3.07)** (1.91) (2.25)* (2.84)** (2.29)* (2.50)* (2.73)** (2.92)** (1.46) (0.86)
Chuquisaca -0.640 -0.501 -0.426 -0.742 -0.730 -0.772 -0.625 -0.485 -0.530 -0.266
(3.53)** (1.56) (1.62) (3.87)** (4.10)** (3.96)** (2.62)** (1.89) (2.14)* (0.80)
La Paz -0.524 -0.675 -0.652 -0.462 -0.457 -0.392 -0.281 -0.469 -0.638 -0.432
(3.22)** (1.77) (1.97)* (1.72) (2.21)* (1.94) (1.53) (2.09)* (2.62)** (1.23)
Cochabamba -0.175 0.225 -0.001 -0.108 -0.137 -0.146 -0.092 -0.186 -0.322 -0.530
(1.03) (0.71) (0.00) (0.57) (0.80) (0.85) (0.52) (0.93) (1.63) (1.80)
Oruro -0.528 -0.615 -0.438 -0.528 -0.486 -0.215 -0.135 -0.323 -0.486 -0.718
(2.63)** (1.46) (1.18) (1.61) (1.56) (0.72) (0.49) (1.27) (2.16)* (2.48)*
Potosi -0.426 0.005 -0.127 -0.127 -0.277 -0.375 -0.440 -0.365 -0.606 -0.655
(1.92) (0.01) (0.41) (0.51) (1.25) (1.96) (2.21)* (1.62) (2.66)** (1.42)
Tarija -0.171 0.054 -0.148 -0.102 -0.104 -0.062 -0.135 -0.198 -0.353 -0.452
(0.97) (0.19) (0.55) (0.47) (0.58) (0.40) (0.84) (0.93) (1.55) (1.73)
Beni 0.049 0.283 -0.089 -0.131 -0.071 -0.035 0.164 0.072 0.269 0.120
(0.24) (0.79) (0.31) (0.57) (0.35) (0.16) (0.60) (0.23) (0.94) (0.40)
Pando 0.480 0.889 0.589 0.562 0.567 0.448 0.434 0.281 0.152 0.387
(1.90) (1.16) (2.02)* (2.58)* (3.23)** (2.32)* (1.74) (0.97) (0.47) (1.08)
Manufacturing industry -0.106 -0.092 -0.071 -0.182 -0.169 -0.173 -0.361 -0.306 -0.324 -0.286
(0.63) (0.31) (0.31) (0.96) (0.96) (0.83) (1.25) (0.90) (1.19) (1.01)
Utilities and transportation0.806 0.857 0.587 0.866 0.941 0.962 0.965 0.931 0.927 0.747
(2.72)** (1.51) (1.11) (2.09)* (2.95)** (3.52)** (3.59)** (3.70)** (3.46)** (2.52)*
Construction 0.375 0.289 0.055 0.289 0.218 0.310 0.398 0.364 0.321 0.192
(1.75) (0.76) (0.20) (1.22) (0.98) (1.20) (1.39) (1.52) (1.71) (0.90)
Commerce 0.332 0.245 0.747 0.574 0.638 0.466 0.243 0.015 -0.017 -0.089
(2.49)* (0.85) (2.89)** (2.80)** (3.88)** (2.68)** (1.20) (0.07) (0.07) (0.36)
Government and business0.553 1.081 0.971 0.867 0.839 0.707 0.481 0.114 -0.131 0.152
(3.37)** (3.45)** (4.13)** (4.42)** (4.66)** (3.78)** (2.29)* (0.48) (0.51) (0.55)
Informal salaried workers 0.041 0.309 0.335 0.221 0.135 0.059 -0.053 -0.098 -0.099 0.058
(0.27) (1.12) (1.79) (1.49) (0.94) (0.42) (0.34) (0.57) (0.63) (0.33)
Self-employed -0.182 -0.635 -0.585 -0.405 -0.341 -0.273 -0.142 0.099 0.292 0.474
(1.42) (2.30)* (2.71)** (2.36)* (2.29)* (1.85) (0.86) (0.50) (1.57) (2.37)*
First Language Spanish 0.107 -0.146 0.089 0.164 0.107 0.154 0.169 0.141 0.095 -0.011
(0.89) (0.61) (0.50) (1.18) (0.86) (1.29) (1.46) (0.99) (0.62) (0.06)
Constant -0.920 -2.456 -2.485 -1.792 -2.014 -1.692 -1.089 0.094 0.456 1.086
(1.85) (2.44)* (2.88)** (2.76)** (3.63)** (3.12)** (1.89) (0.14) (0.69) (1.65)
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Quantile Regression Estimates
 Figure 2.1 






















































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 2.2  


















































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 2.3  


































































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 2.4  


































































































































































































































































































































































Log wage equation 
OLS estimates 
Main urban areas, 1993 and 1997 
1993 1997
Heads No heads Heads No heads
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
No education -0.388 -0.250 -0.446 -0.219
(5.22)** (3.79)** (6.38)** (2.90)**
Secondary school 0.277 0.230 0.179 0.229
(8.11)** (5.93)** (5.25)** (5.81)**
Technical college 0.582 0.597 0.550 0.679
(10.06)** (9.18)** (10.28)** (10.54)**
College 1.120 0.932 0.957 0.878
(24.34)** (15.17)** (19.90)** (13.87)**
Age 0.053 0.063 0.046 0.069
(5.82)** (7.27)** (4.93)** (7.35)**
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(4.59)** (5.94)** (3.76)** (5.96)**
Male 0.316 0.260 0.226 0.274
(6.92)** (5.37)** (5.53)** (5.54)**
Chuquisaca: Sucre -0.331 -0.440 -0.279 -0.346
(4.35)** (6.05)** (4.59)** (5.00)**
La Paz: La Paz y El Alto -0.352 -0.208 -0.234 -0.169
(8.40)** (4.58)** (5.47)** (3.59)**
Cochabamba: Cochabamba -0.298 -0.278 -0.107 -0.166
(6.14)** (5.14)** (2.11)* (3.00)**
Oruro: Oruro -0.708 -0.624 -0.437 -0.334
(10.78)** (8.03)** (7.03)** (4.12)**
Potosi: Potosi -0.617 -0.603 -0.385 -0.458
(8.93)** (7.25)** (7.20)** (6.82)**
Tarija: Tarija -0.410 -0.350 -0.270 -0.251
(6.29)** (4.94)** (4.51)** (3.90)**
Beni: Trinidad -0.084 -0.057 -0.339 -0.197
(1.37) (0.81) (6.71)** (3.60)**
Manufacturing industry -0.043 -0.045 0.183 0.174
(0.66) (0.35) (3.61)** (1.99)*
Utilities and transportation 0.193 0.107 0.369 0.483
(2.83)** (0.76) (6.91)** (4.59)**
Construction 0.030 0.109 0.267 0.482
(0.44) (0.77) (4.96)** (4.88)**
Commerce -0.016 -0.126 0.266 0.225
(0.24) (0.97) (5.36)** (2.63)**
Government and business 0.006 0.020 0.221 0.168
(0.09) (0.16) (4.37)** (1.95)
Informal salaried workers -0.415 -0.377 -0.503 -0.510
(9.12)** (7.33)** (10.06)** (9.66)**
Self-employed -0.312 -0.446 -0.253 -0.351
(9.12)** (9.90)** (7.64)** (8.20)**
Main language Spanish 0.045 0.105 0.165 0.054
(1.35) (2.76)** (5.01)** (1.32)
Spouse 0.302 0.236
(6.42)** (4.68)**
Constant -0.482 -0.727 -0.066 -0.484
(2.40)* (3.82)** (0.34) (2.83)**
Observations 2791 2282 3588 2647
Sigma 0.7094 0.7139 0.8012 0.7841
R-squared 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.33
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  Table 2.7 
Log wage equation 
OLS estimates 
Urban and rural areas, 1997 and 2002 
Urban areas Rural areas
1997 2002 1997 2002
Heads No heads Heads No heads Heads No heads Heads No heads
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
No education -0.449 -0.220 -0.347 -0.033 No education -0.266 -0.152 -0.153 -0.212
(6.44)** (2.92)** (3.33)** (0.35) (3.80)** (1.23) (1.66) (1.15)
Secondary school 0.184 0.232 0.223 0.300 Secondary school 0.285 0.324 0.081 0.477
(5.46)** (6.01)** (5.00)** (6.00)** (3.74)** (2.80)** (0.96) (3.50)**
Technical college 0.560 0.676 0.645 0.796 Technical college 0.570 0.821 0.773 0.950
(10.59)** (10.68)** (8.53)** (9.49)** (4.21)** (3.93)** (4.28)** (3.59)**
College 0.963 0.885 1.012 0.914 College 0.858 0.720 0.754 1.362
(20.26)** (14.29)** (15.39)** (11.47)** (4.02)** (1.94) (3.17)** (3.48)**
Age 0.045 0.069 0.053 0.037 Age 0.036 0.043 0.062 0.032
(4.91)** (7.38)** (4.56)** (3.03)** (2.50)* (1.98)* (3.75)** (1.13)
Age squared -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 Age squared -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(3.74)** (5.98)** (4.05)** (2.09)* (2.40)* (1.68) (3.57)** (0.67)
Male 0.219 0.271 0.268 0.292 Male 0.206 0.524 0.271 0.799
(5.40)** (5.58)** (5.06)** (4.61)** (2.76)** (3.69)** (2.90)** (4.72)**
Chuquisaca -0.278 -0.345 -0.365 -0.300 Chuquisaca -1.156 -0.644 -0.978 -0.663
(4.58)** (5.02)** (4.10)** (3.29)** (11.33)** (4.13)** (9.35)** (3.60)**
La Paz -0.234 -0.170 -0.145 -0.186 La Paz -0.834 -0.132 -0.246 -0.527
(5.47)** (3.63)** (2.42)* (2.88)** (8.78)** (0.87) (2.37)* (2.94)**
Cochabamba -0.107 -0.166 -0.182 -0.208 Cochabamba -0.456 0.036 -0.714 -0.253
(2.10)* (3.02)** (2.77)** (2.94)** (4.69)** (0.24) (6.80)** (1.40)
Oruro -0.438 -0.335 -0.359 -0.303 Oruro -0.516 -0.607 -0.269 -0.564
(7.05)** (4.15)** (4.69)** (3.42)** (5.42)** (3.42)** (2.14)* (2.67)**
Potosi -0.385 -0.459 -0.221 -0.239 Potosi -0.508 -0.637 -0.473 -0.468
(7.21)** (6.86)** (2.83)** (2.35)* (3.26)** (3.43)** (4.31)** (2.05)*
Tarija -0.269 -0.251 0.061 -0.117 Tarija -0.709 -0.464 -0.128 -0.100
(4.50)** (3.91)** (0.82) (1.53) (8.83)** (3.80)** (1.05) (0.56)
Beni -0.341 -0.198 0.092 -0.020 Pando 0.274 0.172 0.714 0.509
(6.77)** (3.65)** (1.17) (0.24) (2.31)* (0.88) (4.77)** (2.01)*
Pando 0.298 0.298 0.205 0.176 Manufacturing indus 0.800 0.424 0.659 -0.173
(2.99)** (2.88)** (1.33) (0.87) (7.40)** (3.28)** (4.71)** (0.95)
Manufacturing industry 0.175 0.164 0.253 0.320 Utilities and transpo 1.225 0.369 1.418 0.916
(3.48)** (1.90) (3.57)** (3.18)** (9.65)** (1.48) (8.93)** (2.78)**
Utilities and transporta 0.355 0.468 0.375 0.514 Construction 0.796 0.561 0.889 0.249
(6.68)** (4.49)** (4.98)** (4.13)** (7.03)** (3.07)** (7.39)** (1.13)
Construction 0.256 0.466 0.385 0.594 Commerce 1.052 0.531 1.164 0.350
(4.80)** (4.79)** (5.18)** (5.00)** (8.88)** (4.07)** (8.64)** (2.51)*
Commerce 0.256 0.209 0.233 0.517 Government and bu 0.513 0.513 0.697 0.555
(5.19)** (2.46)* (3.33)** (5.47)** (4.87)** (3.43)** (4.97)** (3.24)**
Government and busin 0.206 0.155 0.471 0.529 Informal salaried wo -0.509 -0.176 0.050 -0.029
(4.10)** (1.82) (6.65)** (5.47)** (5.12)** (1.31) (0.44) (0.18)
Informal salaried worke -0.504 -0.504 -0.345 -0.481 Self-employed -0.929 -0.334 -0.636 -0.294
(10.17)** (9.68)** (5.80)** (7.55)** (15.62)** (2.80)** (8.74)** (2.18)*
Self-employed -0.247 -0.347 -0.219 -0.358 Main language Spa 0.122 0.116 0.140 -0.014
(7.54)** (8.24)** (4.87)** (6.58)** (1.67) (1.10) (1.58) (0.10)
Main language Spanish 0.165 0.054 -0.039 0.068 conyuge 0.484 0.437
(5.02)** (1.35) (0.85) (1.31) (3.65)** (2.75)**
Spouse 0.245 0.230 Constant 0.349 -0.533 -0.644 -0.542
(4.94)** (3.61)** (1.09) (1.42) (1.82) (1.10)
Constant -0.040 -0.467 -0.227 -0.278 Observations 1919 505 1404 446
(0.21) (2.77)** (0.93) (1.25) Sigma 0.9673 0.8388 0.9946 0.9764
Observations 3659 2710 2364 1840 R-squared 0.45 0.31 0.39 0.32
Sigma 0.8006 0.7806 0.8727 0.8517 Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
R-squared 0.31 0.34 0.27 0.28 * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses




 Figure 2.5  













Source: authors’ calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
 
Figure 2.6  
Hourly wages-education profile 













Source: authors’ calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
 
Figure 2.7  
Hourly wages-education profile 















Source: authors’ calculations based on microdata from household surveys.  
Table 2.8 
Log wage equation 
Quantile regression estimates 
Urban areas, 1993 and 1997 
OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9 OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9
No education -0.388 -0.333 -0.327 -0.321 -0.446 -0.513 -0.303 -0.551
(5.22)** (3.24)** (3.51)** (1.96)* (6.38)** (4.03)** (4.97)** (4.64)**
Secondary school 0.277 0.178 0.209 0.363 0.179 0.150 0.185 0.179
(8.11)** (3.72)** (4.86)** (4.50)** (5.25)** (2.61)** (6.24)** (2.96)**
Technical college 0.582 0.508 0.680 0.668 0.550 0.629 0.639 0.432
(10.06)** (6.08)** (9.32)** (4.99)** (10.28)** (6.45)** (13.79)** (4.76)**
College 1.120 0.803 1.216 1.351 0.957 0.673 1.053 1.157
(24.34)** (12.21)** (21.00)** (12.84)** (19.90)** (7.59)** (25.16)** (14.19)**
Age 0.053 0.057 0.047 0.023 0.046 0.033 0.050 0.047
(5.82)** (4.36)** (4.10)** (1.08) (4.93)** (1.99)* (6.24)** (2.95)**
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(4.59)** (3.94)** (3.28)** (0.48) (3.76)** (1.67) (5.01)** (2.19)*
Male 0.316 0.400 0.259 0.268 0.226 0.248 0.255 0.114
(6.92)** (6.47)** (4.51)** (2.35)* (5.53)** (3.52)** (7.15)** (1.59)
Chuquisaca -0.331 -0.432 -0.363 -0.189 -0.279 -0.202 -0.304 -0.274
(4.35)** (4.02)** (3.79)** (1.06) (4.59)** (1.94) (5.75)** (2.71)**
La Paz -0.352 -0.330 -0.364 -0.299 -0.234 -0.223 -0.292 -0.278
(8.40)** (5.54)** (6.89)** (2.85)** (5.47)** (3.11)** (7.84)** (3.83)**
Cochabamba -0.298 -0.270 -0.341 -0.208 -0.107 -0.109 -0.082 -0.185
(6.14)** (3.97)** (5.59)** (1.76) (2.11)* (1.24) (1.85) (2.12)*
Oruro -0.708 -0.754 -0.727 -0.541 -0.437 -0.317 -0.501 -0.426
(10.78)** (8.20)** (8.83)** (3.47)** (7.03)** (3.01)** (9.27)** (4.00)**
Potosi -0.617 -0.763 -0.725 -0.229 -0.385 -0.342 -0.385 -0.424
(8.93)** (7.66)** (8.32)** (1.33) (7.20)** (3.71)** (8.27)** (4.59)**
Tarija -0.410 -0.298 -0.408 -0.384 -0.270 -0.087 -0.204 -0.385
(6.29)** (3.27)** (4.97)** (2.52)* (4.51)** (0.84) (3.92)** (3.77)**
Beni -0.084 0.025 -0.094 -0.313 -0.339 -0.276 -0.403 -0.245
(1.37) (0.28) (1.22) (2.17)* (6.71)** (3.23)** (9.14)** (2.79)**
Manufacturing industry -0.043 -0.038 -0.028 -0.120 0.183 0.543 0.163 -0.060
(0.66) (0.42) (0.35) (0.76) (3.61)** (6.24)** (3.69)** (0.68)
Utilities and transportation 0.193 0.135 0.187 0.145 0.369 0.688 0.331 0.118
(2.83)** (1.38) (2.17)* (0.87) (6.91)** (7.42)** (7.10)** (1.25)
Construction 0.030 0.153 0.110 -0.192 0.267 0.834 0.316 -0.198
(0.44) (1.56) (1.30) (1.21) (4.96)** (8.94)** (6.74)** (2.14)*
Commerce -0.016 -0.140 -0.041 0.185 0.266 0.526 0.208 0.172
(0.24) (1.51) (0.50) (1.17) (5.36)** (6.05)** (4.81)** (1.98)*
Government and business 0.006 -0.073 0.025 -0.089 0.221 0.624 0.220 -0.151
(0.09) (0.79) (0.31) (0.56) (4.37)** (7.13)** (5.00)** (1.65)
Informal salaried workers -0.415 -0.263 -0.348 -0.532 -0.503 -0.384 -0.400 -0.545
(9.12)** (4.05)** (6.07)** (5.16)** (10.06)** (4.36)** (9.22)** (6.44)**
Self-employed -0.312 -0.435 -0.282 -0.277 -0.253 -0.280 -0.198 -0.152
(9.12)** (8.91)** (6.54)** (3.42)** (7.64)** (4.82)** (6.88)** (2.68)**
Main language Spanish 0.045 0.007 0.046 0.038 0.165 0.186 0.152 0.193
(1.35) (0.14) (1.08) (0.45) (5.01)** (3.34)** (5.31)** (3.37)**
Spouse
Constant -0.482 -1.185 -0.333 0.907 -0.066 -1.027 -0.197 1.126
(2.40)* (4.15)** (1.33) (1.84) (0.34) (2.95)** (1.16) (3.39)**
Observations 2791 2791 2791 2791 3588 3588 3588 3588
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses





OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9 OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9
No education -0.250 -0.355 -0.286 -0.044 -0.219 0.034 -0.287 -0.346
(3.79)** (3.34)** (4.66)** (0.57) (2.90)** (0.28) (5.19)** (2.53)*
Secondary school 0.230 0.114 0.221 0.358 0.229 0.216 0.216 0.345
(5.93)** (1.82) (6.13)** (7.09)** (5.81)** (3.43)** (7.46)** (4.69)**
Technical college 0.597 0.527 0.592 0.660 0.679 0.762 0.780 0.566
(9.18)** (4.72)** (9.83)** (7.86)** (10.54)** (6.50)** (16.41)** (4.79)**
College 0.932 0.656 0.907 1.243 0.878 0.776 0.892 1.013
(15.17)** (6.27)** (15.92)** (17.01)** (13.87)** (7.27)** (19.13)** (8.45)**
Age 0.063 0.083 0.066 0.070 0.069 0.049 0.062 0.073
(7.27)** (6.02)** (8.28)** (6.85)** (7.35)** (3.32)** (8.89)** (3.89)**
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(5.94)** (5.23)** (6.62)** (5.77)** (5.96)** (2.64)** (6.70)** (2.80)**
Male 0.260 0.181 0.222 0.340 0.274 0.256 0.217 0.372
(5.37)** (2.42)* (4.96)** (4.98)** (5.54)** (3.31)** (5.96)** (3.74)**
Chuquisaca -0.440 -0.656 -0.374 -0.371 -0.346 -0.385 -0.328 -0.274
(6.05)** (5.57)** (5.54)** (4.23)** (5.00)** (3.56)** (6.43)** (2.08)*
La Paz -0.208 -0.192 -0.193 -0.194 -0.169 -0.172 -0.218 -0.077
(4.58)** (2.70)** (4.58)** (3.45)** (3.59)** (2.27)* (6.27)** (0.88)
Cochabamba -0.278 -0.229 -0.289 -0.251 -0.166 -0.182 -0.136 -0.177
(5.14)** (2.67)** (5.75)** (3.89)** (3.00)** (2.15)* (3.34)** (1.72)
Oruro -0.624 -0.817 -0.671 -0.303 -0.334 -0.353 -0.349 -0.334
(8.03)** (6.73)** (9.30)** (3.24)** (4.12)** (2.88)** (5.87)** (2.17)*
Potosi -0.603 -0.662 -0.496 -0.600 -0.458 -0.464 -0.439 -0.273
(7.25)** (5.06)** (6.49)** (5.83)** (6.82)** (4.49)** (8.89)** (2.22)*
Tarija -0.350 -0.370 -0.388 -0.450 -0.251 -0.174 -0.309 -0.362
(4.94)** (3.39)** (5.90)** (5.22)** (3.90)** (1.73) (6.54)** (2.97)**
Beni -0.057 -0.028 -0.077 -0.108 -0.197 -0.079 -0.220 -0.256
(0.81) (0.25) (1.18) (1.23) (3.60)** (0.94) (5.46)** (2.51)*
Manufacturing industry -0.045 -0.077 -0.022 0.022 0.174 0.403 0.205 0.006
(0.35) (0.44) (0.19) (0.14) (1.99)* (3.04)** (3.20)** (0.04)
Utilities and transportation 0.107 0.059 0.049 0.145 0.483 0.513 0.526 0.403
(0.76) (0.30) (0.38) (0.86) (4.59)** (3.16)** (6.80)** (2.03)*
Construction 0.109 0.221 0.167 -0.006 0.482 0.889 0.565 -0.003
(0.77) (1.14) (1.29) (0.03) (4.88)** (6.04)** (7.79)** (0.02)
Commerce -0.126 -0.174 -0.095 -0.041 0.225 0.410 0.222 0.133
(0.97) (1.01) (0.79) (0.26) (2.63)** (3.10)** (3.52)** (0.82)
Government and business 0.020 0.123 0.057 -0.004 0.168 0.432 0.134 -0.146
(0.16) (0.70) (0.47) (0.02) (1.95) (3.26)** (2.11)* (0.89)
Informal salaried workers -0.377 -0.283 -0.342 -0.370 -0.510 -0.484 -0.473 -0.542
(7.33)** (3.34)** (7.18)** (5.86)** (9.66)** (5.57)** (12.18)** (5.65)**
Self-employed -0.446 -0.616 -0.461 -0.283 -0.351 -0.507 -0.373 -0.120
(9.90)** (8.21)** (11.07)** (4.71)** (8.20)** (6.69)** (11.82)** (1.45)
Main language Spanish 0.105 0.096 0.118 0.113 0.054 0.024 0.088 0.045
(2.76)** (1.61) (3.35)** (2.41)* (1.32) (0.38) (2.96)** (0.59)
Spouse 0.302 0.078 0.219 0.529 0.236 0.174 0.254 0.250
(6.42)** (1.02) (5.04)** (8.66)** (4.68)** (2.26)* (6.85)** (2.64)**
Constant -0.727 -1.635 -0.811 -0.347 -0.484 -1.150 -0.422 0.389
(3.82)** (6.05)** (4.61)** (1.49) (2.83)** (4.09)** (3.35)** (1.18)
Observations 2282 2282 2282 2282 2647 2647 2647 2647
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
1993 1997
 
 Table 2.9 
Log wage equation 
Quantile regression estimates 
Urban areas, 1997 and 2002 
Household heads
OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9 OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9
No education -0.449 -0.517 -0.313 -0.555 -0.347 -0.071 -0.327 -0.530
(6.44)** (4.25)** (5.19)** (4.70)** (3.33)** (0.39) (3.06)** (3.20)**
Secondary school 0.184 0.151 0.196 0.186 0.223 0.130 0.177 0.288
(5.46)** (2.78)** (6.73)** (3.24)** (5.00)** (1.73) (3.86)** (3.96)**
Technical college 0.560 0.631 0.650 0.434 0.645 0.653 0.750 0.601
(10.59)** (6.82)** (14.27)** (4.98)** (8.53)** (4.86)** (9.65)** (5.11)**
College 0.963 0.678 1.060 1.172 1.012 0.546 1.137 1.288
(20.26)** (8.07)** (25.79)** (14.92)** (15.39)** (4.54)** (16.79)** (13.13)**
Age 0.045 0.034 0.049 0.045 0.053 0.055 0.043 0.053
(4.91)** (2.11)* (6.18)** (2.94)** (4.56)** (2.62)** (3.60)** (2.91)**
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(3.74)** (1.79) (4.92)** (2.17)* (4.05)** (2.68)** (3.18)** (2.31)*
Male 0.219 0.244 0.244 0.108 0.268 0.442 0.243 0.222
(5.40)** (3.67)** (6.96)** (1.61) (5.06)** (4.94)** (4.47)** (2.63)**
Chuquisaca -0.278 -0.212 -0.292 -0.245 -0.365 -0.578 -0.248 -0.231
(4.58)** (2.12)* (5.57)** (2.53)* (4.10)** (3.72)** (2.70)** (1.61)
La Paz -0.234 -0.228 -0.287 -0.276 -0.145 -0.233 -0.118 -0.156
(5.47)** (3.30)** (7.74)** (3.94)** (2.42)* (2.27)* (1.93) (1.59)
Cochabamba -0.107 -0.112 -0.085 -0.170 -0.182 -0.246 -0.178 -0.157
(2.10)* (1.34) (1.93) (2.03)* (2.77)** (2.21)* (2.62)** (1.50)
Oruro -0.438 -0.324 -0.506 -0.426 -0.359 -0.483 -0.408 -0.225
(7.05)** (3.20)** (9.43)** (4.14)** (4.69)** (3.75)** (5.19)** (1.83)
Potosi -0.385 -0.344 -0.384 -0.418 -0.221 -0.182 -0.263 -0.263
(7.21)** (3.90)** (8.30)** (4.71)** (2.83)** (1.38) (3.28)** (2.13)*
Tarija -0.269 -0.096 -0.211 -0.375 0.061 0.038 -0.075 0.122
(4.50)** (0.97) (4.09)** (3.79)** (0.82) (0.30) (0.98) (1.05)
Beni -0.341 -0.280 -0.396 -0.245 0.092 -0.007 0.058 0.065
(6.77)** (3.41)** (9.11)** (2.86)** (1.17) (0.06) (0.71) (0.53)
Pando 0.298 0.407 0.162 0.316 0.205 0.057 0.193 0.179
(2.99)** (2.45)* (1.89) (1.89) (1.33) (0.23) (1.24) (0.76)
Manufacturing industry 0.175 0.542 0.144 -0.063 0.253 0.704 0.077 -0.028
(3.48)** (6.57)** (3.29)** (0.73) (3.57)** (5.76)** (1.05) (0.24)
Utilities and transportation 0.355 0.697 0.305 0.109 0.375 0.757 0.187 0.184
(6.68)** (7.88)** (6.66)** (1.21) (4.98)** (5.78)** (2.41)* (1.48)
Construction 0.256 0.835 0.293 -0.221 0.385 0.939 0.267 -0.095
(4.80)** (9.41)** (6.36)** (2.48)* (5.18)** (7.24)** (3.50)** (0.81)
Commerce 0.256 0.525 0.195 0.169 0.233 0.576 0.031 0.166
(5.19)** (6.37)** (4.57)** (2.03)* (3.33)** (4.74)** (0.43) (1.49)
Government and business 0.206 0.612 0.192 -0.164 0.471 0.904 0.303 0.245
(4.10)** (7.39)** (4.43)** (1.85) (6.65)** (6.98)** (4.16)** (2.22)*
Informal salaried workers -0.504 -0.386 -0.412 -0.549 -0.345 -0.256 -0.258 -0.389
(10.17)** (4.58)** (9.63)** (6.87)** (5.80)** (2.42)* (4.24)** (4.26)**
Self-employed -0.247 -0.271 -0.206 -0.150 -0.219 -0.405 -0.123 0.093
(7.54)** (4.92)** (7.27)** (2.77)** (4.87)** (4.87)** (2.66)** (1.33)
Main language Spanish 0.165 0.183 0.153 0.187 -0.039 -0.056 -0.002 -0.131
(5.02)** (3.44)** (5.38)** (3.39)** (0.85) (0.72) (0.04) (1.77)
Spouse
Constant -0.040 -1.019 -0.144 1.180 -0.227 -1.503 0.099 0.763
(0.21) (3.07)** (0.86) (3.69)** (0.93) (3.45)** (0.39) (1.95)
Observations 3659 3659 3659 3659 2364 2364 2364 2364
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses





OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9 OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9
No education -0.220 0.044 -0.272 -0.359 -0.033 0.032 -0.054 -0.064
(2.92)** (0.35) (3.89)** (2.76)** (0.35) (0.20) (0.60) (0.35)
Secondary school 0.232 0.237 0.224 0.326 0.300 0.245 0.283 0.424
(6.01)** (3.68)** (6.25)** (4.73)** (6.00)** (2.80)** (5.97)** (4.64)**
Technical college 0.676 0.765 0.779 0.567 0.796 0.710 0.885 0.846
(10.68)** (6.41)** (13.31)** (5.09)** (9.49)** (4.52)** (11.11)** (6.05)**
College 0.885 0.804 0.914 1.006 0.914 0.656 0.909 1.249
(14.29)** (7.32)** (15.96)** (9.13)** (11.47)** (4.67)** (11.97)** (8.75)**
Age 0.069 0.049 0.060 0.073 0.037 0.057 0.047 0.013
(7.38)** (3.15)** (6.93)** (4.12)** (3.03)** (2.78)** (4.07)** (0.63)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(5.98)** (2.53)* (5.20)** (2.99)** (2.09)* (2.20)* (3.27)** (0.01)
Male 0.271 0.243 0.216 0.368 0.292 0.164 0.302 0.371
(5.58)** (3.02)** (4.79)** (3.99)** (4.61)** (1.59) (4.99)** (3.17)**
Chuquisaca -0.345 -0.389 -0.345 -0.287 -0.300 -0.296 -0.255 -0.076
(5.02)** (3.40)** (5.40)** (2.33)* (3.29)** (2.00)* (2.94)** (0.50)
La Paz -0.170 -0.185 -0.228 -0.104 -0.186 -0.147 -0.196 -0.009
(3.63)** (2.35)* (5.22)** (1.24) (2.88)** (1.33) (3.21)** (0.08)
Cochabamba -0.166 -0.188 -0.150 -0.188 -0.208 -0.015 -0.265 -0.058
(3.02)** (2.13)* (2.94)** (1.94) (2.94)** (0.12) (3.95)** (0.46)
Oruro -0.335 -0.368 -0.342 -0.345 -0.303 -0.337 -0.339 -0.000
(4.15)** (2.88)** (4.60)** (2.42)* (3.42)** (2.25)* (4.04)** (0.00)
Potosi -0.459 -0.486 -0.451 -0.291 -0.239 -0.002 -0.232 -0.083
(6.86)** (4.42)** (7.25)** (2.47)* (2.35)* (0.01) (2.43)* (0.51)
Tarija -0.251 -0.175 -0.308 -0.360 -0.117 -0.077 -0.119 -0.076
(3.91)** (1.68) (5.18)** (3.15)** (1.53) (0.59) (1.64) (0.55)
Beni -0.198 -0.092 -0.222 -0.261 -0.020 0.063 -0.011 -0.065
(3.65)** (1.05) (4.41)** (2.65)** (0.24) (0.44) (0.14) (0.46)
Pando 0.298 0.465 0.241 0.212 0.176 0.271 -0.093 0.167
(2.88)** (2.77)** (2.51)* (1.14) (0.87) (0.97) (0.50) (0.58)
Manufacturing industry 0.164 0.395 0.198 -0.046 0.320 0.516 0.149 0.167
(1.90) (2.90)** (2.47)* (0.29) (3.18)** (2.95)** (1.56) (0.97)
Utilities and transportation 0.468 0.518 0.514 0.366 0.514 0.769 0.404 0.190
(4.49)** (3.11)** (5.32)** (2.03)* (4.13)** (3.61)** (3.43)** (0.88)
Construction 0.466 0.879 0.552 -0.075 0.594 1.153 0.453 -0.029
(4.79)** (5.73)** (6.12)** (0.44) (5.00)** (5.87)** (4.02)** (0.14)
Commerce 0.209 0.384 0.208 0.071 0.517 0.696 0.283 0.377
(2.46)* (2.80)** (2.64)** (0.47) (5.47)** (4.08)** (3.15)** (2.46)*
Government and business 0.155 0.417 0.133 -0.199 0.529 0.952 0.287 0.266
(1.82) (3.05)** (1.69) (1.28) (5.47)** (5.66)** (3.12)** (1.62)
Informal salaried workers -0.504 -0.469 -0.479 -0.544 -0.481 -0.423 -0.474 -0.398
(9.68)** (5.26)** (9.94)** (6.08)** (7.55)** (3.65)** (7.80)** (3.67)**
Self-employed -0.347 -0.488 -0.366 -0.116 -0.358 -0.602 -0.319 -0.000
(8.24)** (6.20)** (9.40)** (1.51) (6.58)** (5.92)** (6.20)** (0.00)
Main language Spanish 0.054 0.024 0.082 0.034 0.068 0.097 0.003 0.251
(1.35) (0.37) (2.18)* (0.48) (1.31) (1.09) (0.07) (2.73)**
Spouse 0.245 0.190 0.259 0.260 0.230 -0.048 0.311 0.297
(4.94)** (2.38)* (5.63)** (2.92)** (3.61)** (0.47) (5.15)** (2.50)*
Constant -0.467 -1.131 -0.384 0.481 -0.278 -1.661 -0.235 0.795
(2.77)** (3.89)** (2.45)* (1.54) (1.25) (4.79)** (1.11) (1.93)
Observations 2710 2710 2710 2710 1840 1840 1840 1840
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
1997 2002
 
 Table 2.10 
Log wage equation 
Quantile regression estimates 
Rural areas, 1997 and 2002 
Household heads
OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9 OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9
No education -0.266 -0.132 -0.308 -0.397 -0.153 -0.007 -0.151 -0.349
(3.80)** (1.57) (4.38)** (3.52)** (1.66) (0.07) (1.32) (2.06)*
Secondary school 0.285 0.208 0.243 0.497 0.081 0.279 0.026 -0.059
(3.74)** (2.37)* (3.20)** (3.70)** (0.96) (3.08)** (0.25) (0.34)
Technical college 0.570 0.905 0.706 0.097 0.773 0.816 0.714 0.397
(4.21)** (6.12)** (5.21)** (0.46) (4.28)** (4.34)** (3.23)** (1.18)
College 0.858 0.785 0.957 1.157 0.754 0.911 0.803 0.512
(4.02)** (3.08)** (4.50)** (3.35)** (3.17)** (3.97)** (2.77)** (1.21)
Age 0.036 0.025 0.031 0.073 0.062 0.051 0.058 0.030
(2.50)* (1.46) (2.13)* (2.97)** (3.75)** (2.77)** (2.87)** (1.04)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(2.40)* (1.42) (1.99)* (2.71)** (3.57)** (2.49)* (2.76)** (0.89)
Male 0.206 0.211 0.164 0.132 0.271 0.529 0.261 0.125
(2.76)** (2.45)* (2.18)* (1.08) (2.90)** (4.84)** (2.26)* (0.74)
Chuquisaca -1.156 -0.605 -1.049 -1.694 -0.978 -0.747 -0.948 -0.904
(11.33)** (4.93)** (10.23)** (9.28)** (9.35)** (6.34)** (7.41)** (4.60)**
La Paz -0.834 -0.314 -0.760 -1.490 -0.246 -0.158 -0.188 -0.234
(8.78)** (2.74)** (7.98)** (8.46)** (2.37)* (1.32) (1.47) (1.18)
Cochabamba -0.456 -0.080 -0.366 -0.886 -0.714 -0.539 -0.686 -0.708
(4.69)** (0.70) (3.75)** (4.68)** (6.80)** (4.52)** (5.31)** (3.58)**
Oruro -0.516 -0.152 -0.470 -1.041 -0.269 0.020 -0.170 -0.414
(5.42)** (1.40) (4.92)** (6.07)** (2.14)* (0.14) (1.10) (1.70)
Potosi -0.508 -0.275 -0.397 -1.177 -0.473 -0.398 -0.317 -0.521
(3.26)** (1.56) (2.55)* (4.38)** (4.31)** (3.14)** (2.36)* (2.45)*
Tarija -0.709 -0.398 -0.574 -1.191 -0.128 0.296 -0.104 -0.415
(8.83)** (4.31)** (7.09)** (8.53)** (1.05) (2.26)* (0.70) (1.77)
Pando 0.274 0.843 0.512 -0.641 0.714 0.841 0.699 0.495
(2.31)* (6.07)** (4.35)** (3.20)** (4.77)** (5.51)** (3.81)** (1.74)
Manufacturing industry 0.800 1.176 0.865 0.551 0.659 1.069 0.476 0.569
(7.40)** (10.09)** (7.97)** (3.00)** (4.71)** (7.91)** (2.77)** (2.13)*
Utilities and transportation 1.225 1.471 1.307 1.397 1.418 1.116 1.229 1.492
(9.65)** (9.99)** (10.25)** (6.36)** (8.93)** (6.88)** (6.37)** (4.67)**
Construction 0.796 1.559 0.930 0.423 0.889 1.039 0.920 0.439
(7.03)** (12.44)** (8.15)** (2.25)* (7.39)** (7.99)** (6.28)** (1.97)*
Commerce 1.052 1.282 0.991 0.831 1.164 1.301 1.251 0.958
(8.88)** (9.61)** (8.40)** (4.17)** (8.64)** (8.81)** (7.56)** (3.85)**
Government and business 0.513 1.073 0.471 0.348 0.697 1.041 0.530 0.577
(4.87)** (8.92)** (4.45)** (1.95) (4.97)** (7.48)** (3.07)** (2.16)*
Informal salaried workers -0.509 -0.297 -0.385 -0.758 0.050 0.305 -0.023 -0.364
(5.12)** (2.54)* (3.84)** (4.41)** (0.44) (2.57)* (0.17) (1.70)
Self-employed -0.929 -0.674 -0.880 -0.996 -0.636 -0.677 -0.757 -0.509
(15.62)** (10.18)** (14.71)** (9.03)** (8.74)** (9.01)** (8.47)** (3.31)**
Main language Spanish 0.122 0.087 0.113 0.208 0.140 0.202 0.130 0.072
(1.67) (1.03) (1.53) (1.43) (1.58) (1.93) (1.20) (0.45)
Spouse
Constant 0.349 -1.236 0.303 1.375 -0.644 -2.204 -0.515 1.398
(1.09) (3.42)** (0.94) (2.59)** (1.82) (5.77)** (1.18) (2.36)*
Observations 1919 1919 1919 1919 1404 1404 1404 1404
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses




OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9 OLS q = 0.1 q = 0.5 q = 0.9
No education -0.152 -0.015 -0.096 -0.192 -0.212 -0.162 -0.289 -0.119
(1.23) (0.06) (0.57) (0.75) (1.15) (0.32) (1.38) (0.61)
Secondary school 0.324 0.126 0.217 0.480 0.477 0.327 0.452 0.591
(2.80)** (0.59) (1.37) (1.84) (3.50)** (0.93) (2.91)** (3.71)**
Technical college 0.821 1.100 0.699 0.967 0.950 0.765 0.978 0.715
(3.93)** (2.45)* (2.45)* (1.99)* (3.59)** (0.99) (3.33)** (2.21)*
College 0.720 1.104 0.818 0.835 1.362 -1.165 1.606 1.470
(1.94) (3.25)** (1.72) (2.60)** (3.48)** (2.11)* (3.92)** (6.12)**
Age 0.043 0.035 0.048 -0.013 0.032 0.077 0.047 0.003
(1.98)* (0.83) (1.60) (0.29) (1.13) (1.01) (1.44) (0.09)
Age squared -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(1.68) (0.73) (1.44) (0.44) (0.67) (0.71) (0.86) (0.08)
Male 0.524 0.476 0.445 0.741 0.799 0.957 1.054 0.205
(3.69)** (1.53) (2.31)* (2.51)* (4.72)** (1.80) (5.41)** (1.01)
Chuquisaca -0.644 -0.884 -0.423 -0.463 -0.663 -0.612 -0.696 -0.523
(4.13)** (2.80)** (1.98)* (1.27) (3.60)** (1.28) (3.29)** (2.48)*
La Paz -0.132 -0.392 0.022 -0.010 -0.527 -0.762 -0.429 -0.236
(0.87) (1.18) (0.10) (0.03) (2.94)** (1.65) (2.10)* (0.93)
Cochabamba 0.036 -0.198 0.066 -0.123 -0.253 -0.197 -0.155 -0.144
(0.24) (0.55) (0.32) (0.36) (1.40) (0.48) (0.75) (0.69)
Oruro -0.607 -0.613 -0.420 -0.419 -0.564 -0.623 -0.310 -0.577
(3.42)** (1.71) (1.73) (1.02) (2.67)** (1.12) (1.29) (2.50)*
Potosi -0.637 -0.594 -0.576 -0.791 -0.468 -0.160 -0.432 -0.508
(3.43)** (1.52) (2.26)* (1.84) (2.05)* (0.26) (1.64) (1.88)
Tarija -0.464 -0.526 -0.297 -0.462 -0.100 0.219 -0.101 -0.246
(3.80)** (1.99)* (1.77) (1.69) (0.56) (0.46) (0.50) (1.30)
Pando 0.172 0.445 0.131 -0.169 0.509 0.741 0.443 0.721
(0.88) (1.05) (0.50) (0.40) (2.01)* (1.57) (1.63) (2.68)**
Manufacturing industry 0.424 0.440 0.280 0.257 -0.173 -0.174 -0.147 -0.392
(3.28)** (1.61) (1.59) (0.86) (0.95) (0.39) (0.73) (1.85)
Utilities and transportation 0.369 0.297 0.142 0.230 0.916 0.965 1.050 0.529
(1.48) (0.59) (0.42) (0.49) (2.78)** (1.21) (2.95)** (2.57)*
Construction 0.561 1.032 0.476 0.309 0.249 0.141 0.222 0.119
(3.07)** (3.43)** (1.92) (0.73) (1.13) (0.26) (0.87) (0.59)
Commerce 0.531 0.396 0.376 0.569 0.350 0.127 0.537 -0.171
(4.07)** (1.33) (2.12)* (1.95) (2.51)* (0.31) (3.31)** (1.12)
Government and business 0.513 0.772 0.475 0.106 0.555 0.818 0.786 0.203
(3.43)** (2.67)** (2.34)* (0.29) (3.24)** (1.81) (4.01)** (0.98)
Informal salaried workers -0.176 -0.090 -0.144 -0.457 -0.029 0.183 -0.046 -0.022
(1.31) (0.34) (0.80) (1.59) (0.18) (0.51) (0.25) (0.13)
Self-employed -0.334 -0.412 -0.374 -0.131 -0.294 -0.878 -0.326 0.372
(2.80)** (1.73) (2.28)* (0.46) (2.18)* (2.48)* (2.12)* (2.42)*
Main language Spanish 0.116 -0.016 0.170 0.086 -0.014 -0.228 -0.008 0.148
(1.10) (0.06) (1.17) (0.33) (0.10) (0.80) (0.05) (0.86)
Spouse 0.484 0.418 0.400 0.778 0.437 0.327 0.400 0.293
(3.65)** (1.56) (2.24)* (3.68)** (2.75)** (0.72) (2.22)* (1.73)
Constant -0.533 -1.241 -0.552 1.157 -0.542 -2.152 -1.103 1.149
(1.42) (1.51) (1.07) (1.41) (1.10) (1.59) (1.94) (2.22)*
Observations 505 505 505 505 446 446 446 446
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses






Comparisons between quantile regression estimates for the returns to education 











































































































































































 Figure 3.1 
Gini coefficient 
Distribution of equivalized household income 
























































































































Source: Gasparini (2003).  
 
Table 3.1 
Inequality: Gini coefficient 
Distribution of household equivalized income, earnings and wages, 
1993, 1997 and 2002  
Capital Cities*
1993
(48.5 - 51.9) (47.7 - 49.8) (48.0 - 50.7) (49.8 - 53.2) (52.3 - 55.6) (50.1 - 53.5) (52.3 55.1)
1997
(49.2 - 51.4) (48.3 - 50.3) (48.7 - 51.4) (50.9 - 54.5) (52.7 - 55.9) (50.0 - 54.2) (51.8 - 55.4)
2002
(52.4 - 55.7) (50.9 - 53.7) (51.0 - 53.9) (53.6 - 57.6) (55.2 - 59.1) (53.2 - 57.6) (53.9 - 58.8)
Urban
1997
(49.7 - 51.4) (48.8 - 50.9) (49.1 - 51.4) (50.9 - 53.9) (52.9 - 55.8) (49.9 - 53.2) (51.9 55.0)
2002
(51.5 - 53.9) (50.0 - 52.2) (50.3 - 52.8) (52.6 - 56.3) (54.4 - 57.9) (52.0 - 56.3) (53.8 57.4)
National
1997
(56.1 - 57.5) (55.3 - 56.7) (55.2 - 57.0) (55.4 - 58.0) (56.8 - 59.4) (53.9 - 57.0) (55.6 59.0)
2002
(57.8 - 59.9) (57.4 - 59.3) (57.2 - 59.3) (56.6 - 60.1) (57.7 - 60.9) (55.9 - 59.2) (55.9 59.8)
* Capital cities (Sucre, La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Trinidad) and El Alto city






























50.37 49.32 49.84 52.58 54.27 51.91 53.53
53.94 51.98 52.45 55.40 57.00 55.21 56.20
50.52 49.54 49.97 52.64 54.25 51.91 53.41
52.59 51.00 51.40 54.48 56.13 54.20 55.41
56.85 55.93 56.08 56.28 58.07 55.37 57.20
59.24 57.50 58.08 58.80 58.28 58.28 58.40
 
 Table 3.2 
Result of the decompositions  
Changes in the Gini coefficient 
Estimations by OLS 
 
A. 1993-1997 (main cities)













Observed 1993-1997 -0.3 0.8 -0.3 0.8 -0.3 0.8
Returns
   Education - wages -1.0 -1.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.3
   Education - hours 0.5 0.4 0.5
   Gender -0.2 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 0.1
   Unobservables 3.9 2.7 3.6 2.7 3.7 2.9
   Regions 0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Educational structure 0.4 0.4 -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.3
B. 1997-2002 (urban areas)













Observed 1997-2002 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5
Returns
   Education - wages 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7
   Education - hours 0.3 0.2 0.4
   Gender 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
   Unobservables 3.0 2.2 2.9 2.3 3.0 2.3
   Regions -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -1.0 -0.2 -1.0
Educational structure 1.0 1.5 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.9
C. 1997-2002 (rural areas)













Observed 1997-2002 -5.8 -3.7 -5.8 -3.7 -5.8 -3.7
Returns
   Education - wages 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
   Education - hours 0.4 0.3 0.4
   Gender 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2
   Unobservables 1.9 1.1 1.3 0.7 1.4 0.8
   Regions -1.1 -2.1 -1.6 -2.3 -1.6 -2.3
Educational structure 0.3 0.0 -1.4 -0.3 -0.9 -0.4  
 
 
Table 3.3  
Educational structure 
Adult population 
         Main cities          Urban areas              National
1993 1997 1997 2002 1997 2002
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
No education 4.7 3.7 4.9 3.7 10.5 8.2
Primary 38.9 35.5 39.8 38.8 49.0 48.2
Secondary 35.4 39.0 37.0 38.5 27.6 30.5
Technical college 7.5 7.3 6.6 5.9 5.0 4.3
College 13.5 14.5 11.7 13.1 7.9 8.8




Result of the decompositions  
Changes in the Gini coefficient 
Estimations by quantile regression  
Hourly earnings Equivalized income
(i) (ii)
1993-1997
   OLS -1.0 -1.0
Quantile regression  -2.5 -2.7
1997-2002 urban
   OLS 0.2 0.3
Quantile regression  1.0 1.0
1997-2002 rural
   OLS 0.0 -0.1
Quantile regression  1.6 0.8  Table 4.1 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by different annual growth rates in per capita income until 2015  
Real                            Simulations
2002 g=1% g=3% g=5% g=6.5% g=8%
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Mean income 380 432 558 716 861 1033
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
   share decile 10 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0
   ratio 10/1 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5
   Gini coefficient 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2
   Theil  0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.763 1.763 1.763 1.763 1.763
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.554 1.554 1.554 1.554 1.554
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 60.1 49.8 40.4 33.9 29.0
   FGT(1) 36.9 33.3 27.0 21.9 18.8 16.3
   FGT(2) 26.3 23.7 19.3 15.8 13.8 12.1
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 37.1 30.0 24.0 20.6 18.1
   FGT(1) 22.9 20.6 16.8 14.0 12.3 10.9
   FGT(2) 16.5 15.0 12.5 10.5 9.3 8.3
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 46.7 35.0 24.9 18.0 13.6
   FGT(1) 23.5 19.8 13.7 9.1 6.6 4.8
   FGT(2) 13.6 11.2 7.5 4.9 3.6 2.7
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 20.4 13.7 9.0 6.0 3.9
   FGT(1) 9.5 7.6 5.0 3.2 2.4 1.9
   FGT(2) 5.2 4.2 2.8 1.9 1.5 1.3
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 82.1 74.1 65.9 60.2 54.3
   FGT(1) 58.9 55.4 49.0 43.1 39.0 35.2
   FGT(2) 47.1 44.2 38.7 33.7 30.5 27.5
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 64.5 56.8 48.7 44.7 41.3
   FGT(1) 44.7 41.8 36.3 31.7 28.6 25.8
   FGT(2) 35.1 32.7 28.3 24.6 22.1 19.8  





Different annual growth rates in per capita income until 2015  
Poverty-growth elasticities 
                           Simulations
g=1% g=3% g=5% g=6.5% g=8%
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (iv)
Poverty
   National 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.21
   Urban 0.46 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.23
   Rural 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.18
Extreme poverty 
   National 0.34 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.14
   Urban 0.40 0.26 0.19 0.16 0.13
   Rural 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.15  
Source: authors’ calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
 Figure 4.1 
Distribution of log household per capita income 
Kernel estimates of the density functions 
Urban and rural areas 
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Note: the vertical lines in each graph represent and “average” poverty lines for each area.  
 
Table 4.3 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by different redistributive policies  
Real
2002 t=.1 t=.2 t=.3
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Mean income 380 379.6 379.6 379.6
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.3 1.3 2.2 3.2
   share decile 10 47.0 43.3 39.6 35.9
   ratio 10/1 164.5 34.5 17.8 11.2
   Gini coefficient 60.2 54.2 48.2 42.2
   Theil  0.730 0.593 0.478 0.376
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.587 1.410 1.234
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.408 0.321 0.252
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.606 0.474 0.372
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.524 0.387 0.290
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.259 0.995 0.761
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 62.5 60.3 57.7
   FGT(1) 36.9 29.2 23.2 17.2
   FGT(2) 26.3 17.3 11.2 6.5
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 33.6 25.7 13.5
   FGT(1) 22.9 13.2 6.3 1.3
   FGT(2) 16.5 6.7 2.0 0.2
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 51.4 50.0 48.8
   FGT(1) 23.5 19.6 16.2 12.9
   FGT(2) 13.6 9.8 6.9 4.6
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 18.9 13.6 6.3
   FGT(1) 9.5 5.4 2.6 0.7
   FGT(2) 5.2 2.2 0.7 0.1
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 80.7 77.1 72.5
   FGT(1) 58.9 45.1 34.6 24.4
   FGT(2) 47.1 29.7 18.3 9.7
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 57.7 45.7 25.4
   FGT(1) 44.7 26.1 12.4 2.2
   FGT(2) 35.1 14.2 4.0 0.2  
Source: authors’ calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
 Table 4.4. 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by different annual growth rate in earnings until 2015 
Real                            Simulations
2002 g=1% g=5% g=1% g=5%
All All Sample Sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Mean income 380 418 624 413 594
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
   share decile 10 47.0 46.7 46.0 46.7 46.5
   ratio 10/1 164.5 161.4 156.6 162.6 164.4
   Gini coefficient 60.2 60.0 59.6 60.0 60.0
   Theil  0.730 0.722 0.709 0.724 0.725
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.746 1.716 1.752 1.758
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.555 0.551 0.556 0.557
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.910 0.906 0.910 0.905
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.810 0.801 0.811 0.814
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.524 1.473 1.535 1.545
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 61.0 44.9 61.3 47.5
   FGT(1) 36.9 34.0 24.4 34.3 25.8
   FGT(2) 26.3 24.2 17.5 24.4 18.5
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 37.7 26.7 38.1 28.2
   FGT(1) 22.9 21.0 15.5 21.2 16.3
   FGT(2) 16.5 15.3 11.5 15.4 12.1
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 47.7 29.1 48.0 31.3
   FGT(1) 23.5 20.4 10.7 20.7 11.8
   FGT(2) 13.6 11.6 5.8 11.8 6.5
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 21.2 10.5 21.4 11.9
   FGT(1) 9.5 7.9 3.8 8.0 4.3
   FGT(2) 5.2 4.4 2.3 4.4 2.5
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 82.8 70.9 83.1 74.0
   FGT(1) 58.9 56.4 46.8 56.8 48.8
   FGT(2) 47.1 44.9 36.8 45.3 38.3
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 65.0 53.3 65.5 55.2
   FGT(1) 44.7 42.6 34.6 42.9 36.1




Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by an increase in earnings in different sectors  
at a 5% annual rate until 2015 
                                                                Simulations
Real All Primary Manufacturing Utilities Construction Retail Services
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Mean income 380 624 413 409 405 399 437 460
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
   share decile 10 47.0 46.0 45.7 45.8 47.2 46.0 47.6 50.5
   ratio 10/1 164.5 156.6 106.8 171.2 176.0 168.3 190.0 213.9
   Gini coefficient 60.2 59.6 58.4 59.7 60.8 59.7 61.3 63.5
   Theil  0.730 0.709 0.689 0.704 0.740 0.712 0.755 0.828
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.716 1.719 1.687 1.789 1.723 1.812 1.946
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.551 0.517 0.557 0.568 0.557 0.576 0.600
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.906 0.869 0.917 0.917 0.915 0.922 0.927
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.801 0.727 0.815 0.839 0.813 0.858 0.915
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.473 1.477 1.423 1.600 1.484 1.642 1.894
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 44.9 60.9 61.5 62.7 62.1 60.3 60.8
   FGT(1) 36.9 24.4 32.7 34.6 35.9 35.0 34.3 35.1
   FGT(2) 26.3 17.5 22.6 24.8 25.8 25.2 24.7 25.3
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 26.7 36.8 38.7 40.5 39.4 38.9 39.5
   FGT(1) 22.9 15.5 19.2 21.5 22.6 22.0 21.7 22.2
   FGT(2) 16.5 11.5 13.5 15.8 16.4 16.1 15.9 16.2
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 29.1 51.4 48.0 49.5 49.0 45.9 47.1
   FGT(1) 23.5 10.7 22.3 20.3 22.0 21.2 19.8 21.1
   FGT(2) 13.6 5.8 12.9 11.5 12.8 12.2 11.3 12.2
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 10.5 24.3 21.5 23.9 23.1 21.5 22.8
   FGT(1) 9.5 3.8 9.0 7.7 9.1 8.5 7.9 8.6
   FGT(2) 5.2 2.3 4.9 4.3 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.8
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 70.9 76.6 83.7 84.3 83.6 83.9 83.4
   FGT(1) 58.9 46.8 49.7 58.0 58.6 57.7 58.3 58.1
   FGT(2) 47.1 36.8 38.6 46.5 47.0 46.4 46.8 46.7
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 53.3 57.4 66.8 67.7 66.1 67.4 66.9
   FGT(1) 44.7 34.6 36.1 44.2 44.7 44.1 44.4 44.5
   FGT(2) 35.1 26.7 27.5 34.7 35.1 34.8 34.9 34.9  
 
 Figure 4.2 
Growth-incidence curves 













All Primary Manufacturing Services  
 
Table 4.6 
Average annual growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from an annual 5% growth in earnings, by sector 
All Primary Manufacturing Utilities Construction Retail Services
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Below extreme poverty line 4.3 2.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.4
Below poverty line 4.1 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.9
Above poverty line 4.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 1.2 1.3  
 
Table 4.7 
Average annual growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from an annual 5% growth in earnings, by sector 
All Urban Rural
(i) (ii) (iii)
Below extreme poverty line 4.3 2.0 2.7
Below poverty line 4.1 3.3 1.2
Above poverty line 4.0 3.4 0.8  
 
Figure 4.3 














 Table 4.8 
Scenarios for educational structure 
Urban
                                                     scenarios 2002-2015
2 0 0 2 s 1s 2s 3s 4
Without education 0.045 0.025 0.005 0.000 0.000
Primary drop-outs 0.353 0.323 0.293 0.200 0.050
Primary graduates 0.073 0.103 0.133 0.150 0.300
Secondary drop-outs 0.167 0.177 0.187 0.200 0.100
Secondary graduates 0.166 0.176 0.186 0.200 0.300
College 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.250 0.250
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Rural
                                                     scenarios 2002-2015
2 0 0 2 s 1s 2s 3s 4
Without education 0.151 0.091 0.031 0.050 0.000
Primary drop-outs 0.589 0.559 0.529 0.450 0.200
Primary graduates 0.073 0.103 0.133 0.150 0.400
Secondary drop-outs 0.104 0.134 0.164 0.150 0.100
Secondary graduates 0.051 0.081 0.111 0.120 0.200
College 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.080 0.100
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
 
Table 4.9 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by different scenarios for the educational structure 
                                                            Simulations
Real              s1                 s2                s3            s4
2002 OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Mean income 379.8 381.7 381.7 383.4 383.8 398.1 401.3 402.7 406.8
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
   share decile 10 47.0 46.8 46.9 46.7 46.8 46.6 46.9 46.1 46.2
   ratio 10/1 164.5 162.4 163.0 160.5 161.4 165.8 166.2 161.6 161.9
   Gini coefficient 60.2 60.1 60.1 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.3 59.7 59.8
   Theil  0.730 0.725 0.725 0.722 0.722 0.720 0.732 0.708 0.713
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.755 1.755 1.748 1.748 1.744 1.783 1.707 1.726
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.556 0.556 0.555 0.554 0.557 0.559 0.553 0.555
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.914 0.915 0.914 0.915
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.811 0.811 0.809 0.808 0.813 0.820 0.805 0.810
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.539 1.540 1.528 1.528 1.520 1.589 1.456 1.490
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 64.7 64.6 64.5 64.7 63.1 63.2 62.4 61.9
   FGT(1) 36.9 36.6 36.6 36.4 36.3 35.5 35.5 34.8 34.8
   FGT(2) 26.3 26.1 26.0 25.9 25.8 25.2 25.3 24.8 24.8
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 41.5 41.2 41.2 41.0 40.0 39.7 38.5 38.6
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.6 22.6 22.4 22.4 21.9 21.9 21.5 21.5
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.2 16.2 15.9 15.9 15.7 15.7
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 52.4 52.5 52.4 52.4 50.5 50.5 50.0 49.5
   FGT(1) 23.5 23.2 23.3 23.0 23.0 22.0 22.1 21.6 21.6
   FGT(2) 13.6 13.5 13.5 13.3 13.3 12.6 12.7 12.4 12.4
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 25.5 25.5 25.2 25.4 24.1 24.0 22.9 23.1
   FGT(1) 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.2 9.3 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.7
   FGT(2) 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.1 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.8
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 84.7 84.5 84.4 84.9 83.8 84.1 82.6 82.3
   FGT(1) 58.9 58.5 58.4 58.3 58.1 57.6 57.5 56.6 56.6
   FGT(2) 47.1 46.8 46.7 46.6 46.4 46.0 45.8 45.2 45.1
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 67.8 67.0 67.4 66.8 66.2 65.5 64.2 64.1
   FGT(1) 44.7 44.4 44.3 44.1 43.9 43.5 43.4 42.7 42.7
   FGT(2) 35.1 34.8 34.8 34.7 34.5 34.3 34.1 33.7 33.7  
 
Table 4.10 
Wages and number of workers 
Urban areas 
     Number of workers
wage Real Simulation 4
(i) (ii) (iii)
No education 3.1 90 0
Primary incomplete 4.2 834 113
Primary complete 4.9 137 677
Secondary incomplete 5.3 331 226
Secondary complete 6.3 314 677
Superior 13.7 551 564
Total 2257 2257
Average wage
   Real 7.0
   Simulated (s4) 7.5
   Change (%) 8.0  
 Table 4.11 
Poverty-growth elasticities 
Different scenarios for the educational structure 
                                                            Simulations
              s1                 s2                s3            s4
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Poverty
   National 0.79 0.87 0.61 0.32 0.41 0.33 0.45 0.45
   Urban 0.99 0.84 0.61 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.48 0.49
   Rural 0.44 0.92 0.61 0.03 0.24 0.15 0.39 0.37
Extreme poverty 
   National 0.43 1.06 0.60 0.67 0.36 0.36 0.54 0.44
   Urban 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.47 0.36 0.32 0.50 0.39














s1 s4  
 
Table 4.12 
Average growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from different educational structures  
                                                            Simulations
              s1                 s2                s3            s4
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Below extreme poverty line 1.34 1.47 2.53 2.76 5.83 6.11 8.57 8.74
Below poverty line 1.20 1.02 1.60 1.75 5.86 6.30 8.43 9.38
Above poverty line 0.54 0.58 1.15 1.36 5.55 6.07 7.22 8.66
Total 1.02 1.05 1.82 2.02 5.74 6.14 8.06 8.86  
 
Table 4.13 
Decomposition of the change in poverty 
Growth and redistribution effects  
Different educational structures  
                                                            Simulations
              s1                 s2                s3            s4
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
   Total change -0.409 -0.444 -0.588 -0.342 -1.957 -1.875 -2.707 -3.178
   Growth effect -0.177 -0.177 -0.323 -0.323 -1.698 -1.982 -2.080 -2.264
   Redistribution effect -0.232 -0.267 -0.265 -0.019 -0.259 0.107 -0.627 -0.914  
 
 Table 4.14 
Scenarios for sectoral structure 
Urban
                                                     scenarios 2002-2015
2002 s1 s2 s3 s4
Primary activities 0.116 0.092 0.066 0.016 0.010
Manufacturing 0.157 0.152 0.207 0.207 0.200
Utilities and transportation 0.083 0.065 0.083 0.083 0.080
Construction 0.087 0.084 0.087 0.087 0.060
Commerce 0.301 0.354 0.301 0.301 0.350
Skilled-services 0.256 0.253 0.256 0.306 0.300
Total 1.000 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Rural
                                                     scenarios 2002-2015
2002 s1 s2 s3 s4
Primary activities 0.795 0.710 0.745 0.695 0.650
Manufacturing 0.035 0.024 0.085 0.085 0.100
Utilities and transportation 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.020
Construction 0.032 0.063 0.032 0.032 0.030
Commerce 0.063 0.116 0.063 0.063 0.100
Skilled-services 0.058 0.066 0.058 0.108 0.100
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0  
 
Table 4.15 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by different scenarios of sectoral structure 
                                                            Simulations
Real              s1                 s2                s3            s4
2002 OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Mean income 379.8 383.8 383.0 382.0 380.5 387.8 384.0 389.1 386.5
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31
   share decile 10 47.0 46.7 46.6 46.9 46.9 46.7 46.6 46.7 46.5
   ratio 10/1 164.5 155.3 153.9 162.7 157.8 154.6 157.2 152.6 149.8
   Gini coefficient 60.2 59.8 59.8 60.1 60.1 59.9 59.8 59.8 59.7
   Theil  0.730 0.720 0.718 0.727 0.726 0.721 0.719 0.719 0.714
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.750 1.743 1.760 1.759 1.750 1.744 1.747 1.734
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.551 0.551 0.556 0.555 0.552 0.552 0.551 0.550
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.911 0.909 0.912 0.911 0.910 0.911 0.911 0.911
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.802 0.800 0.812 0.809 0.803 0.803 0.801 0.797
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.531 1.519 1.549 1.546 1.530 1.521 1.526 1.504
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 64.6 64.2 64.6 64.9 64.1 64.0 64.1 64.6
   FGT(1) 36.9 36.2 36.2 36.5 36.6 36.0 36.1 35.8 35.9
   FGT(2) 26.3 25.7 25.8 26.1 26.1 25.5 25.7 25.4 25.4
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 40.6 41.1 41.3 41.5 40.6 40.9 40.0 40.4
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.2 22.4 22.6 22.7 22.1 22.2 22.0 22.0
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.1 16.1 16.4 16.4 16.0 16.1 15.9 15.9
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 52.9 52.5 52.7 52.9 52.1 52.5 52.1 52.5
   FGT(1) 23.5 23.5 23.4 23.3 23.4 22.8 22.9 23.0 23.1
   FGT(2) 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.5 13.6 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 26.0 26.0 25.7 25.8 24.8 25.0 24.8 25.5
   FGT(1) 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.4 9.5 9.1 9.1 9.3 9.3
   FGT(2) 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 83.7 83.5 84.3 84.6 83.8 83.1 83.8 84.6
   FGT(1) 58.9 57.0 57.3 58.3 58.4 57.5 57.8 56.8 56.9
   FGT(2) 47.1 45.4 45.7 46.7 46.7 45.9 46.3 45.2 45.3
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 64.6 65.8 67.1 67.3 66.4 67.1 64.9 64.8
   FGT(1) 44.7 43.0 43.2 44.3 44.3 43.5 43.8 42.8 42.9
   FGT(2) 35.1 33.9 33.9 34.8 34.7 34.1 34.3 33.6 33.7  
 
 Table 4.16 
Wages and number of workers by sector 
Workers aged 30 to 50 
Urban areas 
     Number of workers
wage Real Simulation 4
(i) (ii) (iii)
Primary activities 4.6 218 23
Manufacturing 4.8 325 451
Utilities and transportation 6.8 215 181
Construction 4.7 213 135
Commerce 5.8 639 790
Skilled-services 10.9 647 677
Total 2257 2257
Average wage
   Real 7.0
   Simulated (s4) 7.1














s1 s2 s3 s4  
 
Table 4.17 
Average growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from different scenarios for the sectoral structure 
                                                            Simulations
              s1                 s2                s3            s4
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Below extreme poverty line 5.78 6.09 1.76 2.25 6.61 4.67 7.97 7.98
Below poverty line 2.21 2.44 0.97 0.48 2.92 2.67 3.52 2.84
Above poverty line 1.16 1.21 0.54 0.09 2.20 1.01 2.60 2.24
Total 3.30 3.50 1.14 1.07 4.18 2.90 5.01 4.73  
 
Table 4.18 
Decomposition of the change in poverty 
Growth and redistribution effects  
Different sectoral structures  
                                                            Simulations
              s1                 s2                s3            s4
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
   Total change -0.508 -0.827 -0.419 -0.142 -1.006 -1.025 -0.987 -0.455
   Growth effect -0.323 -0.323 -0.250 -0.033 -0.700 -0.327 -0.918 -0.455
   Redistribution effect -0.185 -0.504 -0.169 -0.109 -0.306 -0.698 -0.068 0.000  
  
Table 4.19 
Scenarios for changes in labor informality 
Urban
                                                     scenarios 2002-2015
2002 s1 s2 s3 s4
formal 0.372 0.272 0.472 0.472 0.572
informal-wage earners 0.129 0.179 0.129 0.029 0.079
informal-self employed 0.499 0.549 0.399 0.499 0.349
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Rural
                                                     scenarios 2002-2015
2002 s1 s2 s3 s4
formal 0.155 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.355
informal-wage earners 0.056 0.036 0.056 0.000 0.000
informal-self employed 0.789 0.709 0.689 0.745 0.645




Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by changes in informality 
                                                            Simulations
Real              s1                 s2                s3            s4
2002 OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Mean income 379.8 371.7 373.9 387.5 385.2 388.0 387.3 394.4 389.8
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29
   share decile 10 47.0 46.8 46.6 46.6 46.5 46.4 46.6 46.3 46.3
   ratio 10/1 164.5 155.9 156.3 157.9 156.6 163.2 160.3 157.5 157.8
   Gini coefficient 60.2 59.9 59.9 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.1 59.8 59.8
   Theil  0.730 0.723 0.719 0.723 0.720 0.719 0.723 0.716 0.715
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.760 1.746 1.748 1.743 1.735 1.745 1.735 1.733
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.552 0.552 0.555 0.554 0.557 0.557 0.554 0.552
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.909 0.910 0.911 0.911 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.911
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.802 0.803 0.809 0.807 0.813 0.813 0.806 0.803
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.549 1.524 1.527 1.518 1.505 1.523 1.504 1.502
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 65.6 65.5 64.4 64.3 64.0 64.1 63.3 63.6
   FGT(1) 36.9 37.2 37.0 36.1 36.3 36.1 36.2 35.5 35.7
   FGT(2) 26.3 26.4 26.3 25.7 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.2 25.4
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 42.0 41.7 40.7 40.7 40.8 40.6 39.5 40.0
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.8 22.8 22.3 22.4 22.4 22.5 21.9 22.1
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.4 16.5 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.3 15.9 16.0
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 53.9 53.6 51.9 51.7 51.3 51.5 50.6 50.9
   FGT(1) 23.5 24.3 23.9 22.7 22.9 22.4 22.5 22.0 22.2
   FGT(2) 13.6 14.1 13.9 13.1 13.2 12.9 13.0 12.6 12.8
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 26.6 25.9 24.7 24.6 24.5 24.2 23.2 23.9
   FGT(1) 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.1 9.2 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.8
   FGT(2) 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 84.9 85.0 84.8 85.0 84.9 84.8 84.2 84.4
   FGT(1) 58.9 58.4 58.5 58.2 58.3 58.6 58.7 57.6 57.9
   FGT(2) 47.1 46.6 46.8 46.4 46.5 46.9 47.0 45.9 46.2
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 67.4 67.7 67.2 67.1 67.6 67.6 66.4 66.5
   FGT(1) 44.7 44.1 44.3 43.9 44.0 44.5 44.6 43.4 43.9




Average growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from changes in informality 
                                                            Simulations
              s1                 s2                s3            s4
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Below extreme poverty line 1.9 1.6 4.8 4.6 2.7 2.9 7.3 6.6
Below poverty line -1.7 -0.6 2.7 2.0 3.1 2.6 5.1 4.2
Above poverty line -1.9 -1.0 2.2 1.6 2.7 2.3 4.3 2.9
Total -0.3 0.1 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.6 5.7 4.7  
  
Table 4.22 
Scenarios for number of children  
Urban
                                      scenarios 2002-2015
Number of children 2002 s1 s2 s3
0 0.343 0.302 0.365 0.350
1 0.242 0.315 0.262 0.300
2 0.210 0.231 0.210 0.250
3 0.112 0.084 0.102 0.060
4 0.055 0.053 0.045 0.030
5 0.025 0.008 0.015 0.010
6 0.009 0.006 0.000 0.000
7 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Rural
                                         scenarios 2002-2015
Number of children 2002 s1 s2 s3
0 0.285 0.173 0.307 0.300
1 0.176 0.183 0.196 0.200
2 0.138 0.125 0.138 0.150
3 0.140 0.154 0.130 0.140
4 0.092 0.097 0.082 0.080
5 0.080 0.107 0.070 0.070
6 0.041 0.071 0.041 0.030
7 0.020 0.035 0.020 0.010
8 0.027 0.054 0.016 0.020
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0  
 
Table 4.23 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by changes in the number of children under 12 
                                                            Simulations
Real              s1                 s2                s3
2002 OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Mean income 379.8 390.8 391.0 402.0 402.8 407.7 407.7
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29
   share decile 10 47.0 47.1 47.2 46.7 46.7 46.8 46.7
   ratio 10/1 164.5 179.6 179.3 163.1 163.3 164.3 163.2
   Gini coefficient 60.2 60.5 60.6 60.0 60.1 59.9 59.9
   Theil  0.730 0.736 0.740 0.724 0.727 0.723 0.725
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.770 1.789 1.760 1.772 1.755 1.771
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.567 0.567 0.556 0.557 0.555 0.555
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.921 0.919 0.910 0.913 0.910 0.911
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.836 0.836 0.811 0.813 0.810 0.809
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.566 1.600 1.548 1.570 1.540 1.569
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 64.0 63.9 62.7 62.4 61.8 61.7
   FGT(1) 36.9 36.4 36.4 35.1 35.1 34.5 34.5
   FGT(2) 26.3 26.1 26.2 25.0 25.0 24.6 24.6
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 40.4 40.7 39.0 39.2 38.3 38.1
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.8 22.9 21.7 21.8 21.4 21.3
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.7 16.7 15.8 15.8 15.6 15.6
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 50.4 50.3 49.9 49.5 48.6 48.7
   FGT(1) 23.5 21.8 21.8 21.4 21.5 20.5 20.6
   FGT(2) 13.6 12.5 12.5 12.3 12.3 11.7 11.6
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 22.8 23.0 22.5 22.8 21.5 21.3
   FGT(1) 9.5 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.5 8.0 7.9
   FGT(2) 5.2 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.3
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 86.2 86.1 83.8 83.5 83.5 83.0
   FGT(1) 58.9 60.4 60.4 57.6 57.5 57.4 57.3
   FGT(2) 47.1 48.6 48.6 46.0 45.9 45.8 45.8
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 69.4 69.8 66.0 66.2 66.0 65.8
   FGT(1) 44.7 46.2 46.3 43.5 43.5 43.4 43.4
   FGT(2) 35.1 36.3 36.4 34.2 34.2 34.0 34.0  
 
 Table 4.24 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by changes in the returns to education  
                                                            Simulations
Real              s1  s2 s3  s4  s5
2002 OLS QR OLS OLS QR QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Mean income 379.8 409.4 413.7 433.8 392.5 385.5 369.5
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.31
   share decile 10 47.0 48.1 48.6 50.1 46.4 46.5 45.4
   ratio 10/1 164.5 178.6 183.9 199.7 162.3 157.8 148.5
   Gini coefficient 60.2 61.2 61.6 62.9 59.8 59.8 59.0
   Theil  0.730 0.762 0.776 0.819 0.715 0.717 0.688
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.830 1.864 1.953 1.730 1.739 1.669
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.571 0.575 0.590 0.554 0.553 0.544
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.917 0.919 0.922 0.913 0.911 0.908
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.845 0.855 0.892 0.806 0.804 0.785
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.675 1.737 1.907 1.497 1.512 1.393
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 63.0 63.0 62.5 63.3 63.9 64.6
   FGT(1) 36.9 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.5 36.0 36.6
   FGT(2) 26.3 25.5 25.6 25.7 25.3 25.7 26.1
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 40.2 40.2 40.5 39.8 40.9 41.2
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.2 22.3 22.4 21.9 22.3 22.7
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.2 16.2 16.3 16.0 16.1 16.4
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 49.9 50.2 49.1 50.7 51.3 51.6
   FGT(1) 23.5 21.9 22.1 21.8 21.8 22.4 22.6
   FGT(2) 13.6 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.5 12.8 12.9
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 23.7 23.7 24.1 23.1 24.6 24.3
   FGT(1) 9.5 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.5 8.9 8.9
   FGT(2) 5.2 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.8 4.8
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 84.6 84.2 84.5 84.0 84.6 86.1
   FGT(1) 58.9 58.4 58.2 58.6 58.0 58.5 59.7
   FGT(2) 47.1 46.7 46.6 46.9 46.4 46.7 47.7
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 67.5 67.4 67.6 67.2 67.6 68.9
   FGT(1) 44.7 44.3 44.2 44.5 44.0 44.3 45.2
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 Table 4.25 
Average growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from changes in the returns to education  
                                                            Simulations
              s1  s2 s3  s4  s5
OLS QR OLS OLS QR QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Below extreme poverty line 3.0 2.5 2.2 4.6 4.1 2.8
Below poverty line 5.0 4.8 6.2 4.9 3.2 1.3
Above poverty line 6.8 7.6 11.7 3.8 1.5 -1.7




Changes in the returns to education 
                                                            Simulations
              s1  s2 s3  s4  s5
OLS QR OLS OLS QR QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Poverty
   National 0.261 0.226 0.180 0.532 0.767 -0.163
   Urban 0.389 0.311 0.269 0.683 1.103 -0.512
   Rural 0.051 0.086 0.033 0.283 0.214 0.411
Extreme poverty 
   National 0.194 0.170 0.086 0.585 0.584 -0.217
   Urban 0.283 0.241 0.127 0.823 0.843 -0.573
   Rural 0.048 0.053 0.018 0.195 0.157 0.369  
 
Table 4.27 
Decomposition of the change in poverty 
Growth and redistribution effects  
Changes in the returns to education 
                                                            Simulations
              s1  s2 s3  s4  s5
OLS QR OLS OLS QR QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
   Total change -2.034 -2.018 -2.561 -1.787 -1.164 -0.441
   Growth effect -2.512 -3.150 -5.030 -1.291 -0.408 1.162
   Redistribution effect 0.478 1.132 2.469 -0.496 -0.756 -1.603  
 Table 4.28 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by changes in the wage gap by gender, race and labor formality 
                                                            Simulations
Real        s1-gender                 s2-race                s3-informality
2002 OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Mean income 379.8 405.8 405.5 391.1 390.6 420.9 407.2
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.38
   share decile 10 47.0 46.8 46.9 46.2 46.2 45.1 45.0
   ratio 10/1 164.5 171.8 171.5 144.7 146.1 126.5 117.2
   Gini coefficient 60.2 60.3 60.4 59.2 59.4 58.4 58.1
   Theil  0.730 0.725 0.727 0.704 0.706 0.675 0.672
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.736 1.743 1.720 1.722 1.654 1.665
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.561 0.561 0.542 0.544 0.529 0.521
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.916 0.916 0.908 0.908 0.907 0.902
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.824 0.824 0.781 0.786 0.753 0.737
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.507 1.519 1.479 1.482 1.369 1.386
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 62.6 62.8 63.1 63.2 59.8 61.2
   FGT(1) 36.9 35.3 35.3 35.0 35.2 32.3 32.8
   FGT(2) 26.3 25.2 25.2 24.7 24.9 22.5 22.6
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 39.5 39.7 38.4 39.0 35.4 36.2
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.0 22.0 21.3 21.5 19.3 19.3
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.0 15.9 15.4 15.5 13.9 13.7
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 49.9 50.0 51.0 50.7 47.0 48.7
   FGT(1) 23.5 21.6 21.6 22.0 21.9 19.7 20.2
   FGT(2) 13.6 12.4 12.4 12.6 12.5 11.0 11.2
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 23.0 23.1 22.6 22.9 20.1 20.8
   FGT(1) 9.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 7.4 7.5
   FGT(2) 5.2 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.0 4.0
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 83.4 83.7 83.0 83.7 80.8 81.6
   FGT(1) 58.9 57.6 57.9 56.4 57.0 53.1 53.3
   FGT(2) 47.1 46.2 46.3 44.7 45.2 41.5 41.4
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 66.6 67.0 64.5 65.5 60.6 61.6
   FGT(1) 44.7 43.9 44.0 42.2 42.7 38.8 38.6
















Average growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from closing the wage gap due to gender, race and informality 
                                                            Simulations
              s1-gender                 s2-race                s3-formal
OLS QR OLS QR OLS QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Below extreme poverty line 5.5 5.5 11.2 9.8 30.5 31.9
Below poverty line 6.8 6.6 5.4 5.0 15.8 12.1
Above poverty line 7.7 7.5 3.3 3.2 12.1 7.5
Total 6.6 6.5 7.0 6.3 20.5 18.6  
 
 Table 4.30 
Statistics for the simulated household income distribution  
generated by 
                  Simulations
Real                s1 s2
2002 OLS QR QR
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Mean income 379.8 380.7 381.7 383.0
Inequality
   share decile 1 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
   share decile 10 47.0 46.9 46.9 46.8
   ratio 10/1 164.5 161.3 160.3 161.7
   Gini coefficient 60.2 60.1 60.1 60.0
   Theil  0.730 0.726 0.725 0.724
   coeff. of variation 1.763 1.756 1.754 1.751
   Atkinson (1) 0.558 0.555 0.555 0.555
   Atkinson (2) 0.912 0.911 0.911 0.912
   Entropy (0) 0.816 0.811 0.810 0.810
   Entropy (2) 1.554 1.542 1.538 1.533
Poverty (National)
   Headcount 65.1 65.3 65.0 64.6
   FGT(1) 36.9 36.6 36.6 36.4
   FGT(2) 26.3 26.1 26.0 26.0
Extreme poverty  (National)
   Headcount 41.8 41.4 41.0 41.3
   FGT(1) 22.9 22.7 22.6 22.5
   FGT(2) 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.3
Poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 53.0 53.3 53.0 52.3
   FGT(1) 23.5 23.4 23.3 23.2
   FGT(2) 13.6 13.5 13.5 13.4
Extreme poverty (Urban)
   Headcount 25.9 25.6 25.2 25.6
   FGT(1) 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4
   FGT(2) 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2
Poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 85.0 85.1 84.7 84.7
   FGT(1) 58.9 58.4 58.3 58.2
   FGT(2) 47.1 46.8 46.6 46.5
Extreme poverty (Rural)
   Headcount 67.9 67.4 67.0 67.1
   FGT(1) 44.7 44.3 44.2 44.1
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Table 4.31 
Average growth rates in household per capita income  
resulting from an increase in education with a 5% fall in returns 
                  Simulations
                 s1 s2
OLS QR QR
(i) (ii) (iii)
Below extreme poverty line 1.4 2.0 2.0
Below poverty line 0.7 0.8 1.4
Above poverty line 0.3 0.7 1.1
Total 0.9 1.2 1.6   